DigitalCommons@NYLS
Articles & Chapters

Faculty Scholarship

Spring 2022

"Insanity Is Smashing up against My Soul": The Fifth Circuit and
Competency to Be Executed Cases after Panetti v. Quarterman
Michael L. Perlin
Talia Roitberg Harmon

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/fac_articles_chapters
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Criminal Law Commons, and the Law and Psychology
Commons

"INSANITY IS SMASHING UP AGAINST MY SOUL": THE
FIFTH CIRCUIT AND COMPETENCY TO BE EXECUTED
CASES AFTER PANETTI V. QUARTERMAN

Michael L. Perlin, Esq. & Talia Roitberg Harmon, Ph.D.*
INTRODUCTION

One of the open secrets of death penalty law and policy is the
astonishingly high percentage of individuals on death row with serious
mental disabilities. 1 This is well known to lawyers who represent this cohort 2
(and presumably, equally well known to the district attorneys who
nevertheless prosecute them and the judges who try their cases and sentence
them), 3 but is not generally discussed in the press or, certainly, in political
discourse. 4 There is the occasional case that anecdotally becomes famousperhaps none more so than that of Ricky Rector, who had so little

Michael L. Perlin, Esq., Professor Emeritus of Law, Founding Director, International Mental
Disability Law Reform Project, Co-founder, Mental Disability Law and Policy Associates, New York
Law School. Talia Roitberg Harmon, Ph.D., Chair and Professor, Niagara University, Department of
Criminal Justice and Criminology. The authors wish to thank Joel Dvoskin, Mark Cunningham, Alec
Kassoff, Joe Margulies, Amanda Amendola, Nicole Perry, Haleigh Kubiniec, and Nathan Elmore for their
helpful comments and insights, and also wish to thank Meredith Harbison and her entire editing team at
the University of Louisville Law Review for their comments and suggestions which, we think, made this
a much stronger article.
' Hearing on S. 1479 Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 1984 Leg., Leg. No. 201, 1st Sess. (N.J. 1984)
(statement of Joseph H. Rodriguez, Pub. Advoc. N.J.) (cited in MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY
AND THE DEATH PENALTY:

THE SHAME OF THE STATES 1

(2013) [hereinafter PERLIN, MENTAL

DISABILITY AND THE DEATH PENALTY]); compare PositionStatement 54: Death Penalty and People with
Mental Illness, MENTAL HEALTH AM. (June 14, 2016), http://www.mentalhealthamerica.net/positions/
death-penalty [https://perma.cc/B3YL-Y6GZ] (noting at least 20% of death row inmates have a severe
mental illness), with Danielle N. Devens, Competency for Execution in the Wake of Panetti: Shifting the
Burden to the Government, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 1335, 1355 (2010) (estimating that half of the nation's death
row population suffers from severe mental illness), and ROBERT JOHNSON, DEATH WORK: A STUDY OF
THE MODERN EXECUTION PROCESS 50 (1990) (estimating that 70% of death row inmates suffer from
mental illnesses).
2 See, e.g., Elena De Santis, Life with the Imposition or Exacerbation of Severe Mental Illness and
Chance of Death: Why This Distinct Punishment Violates the Eighth Amendment, 56 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
235 (2019) (for a survey of all relevant issues).
a See Michael Mullan, How Should Mental Illness Be Relevant to Sentencing?, 88 MIss. L.J. 255,
262 (2019) (suggesting it appears that a significant number of "judges are not aware or not willing to use
the discretion afforded to them to award lesser sentences to those with mental illnesses.").
4 See Gerald E. Nora, Prosecutor as "Nurse Ratched"? Misusing Criminal Justice as Alternative
Medicine, 22 CRIM. JUST. 18, 20 (2007) (noting the criminal justice system's willful ignorance of
defendants' mental health issues).
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appreciation of what death meant that "he thought he was going to come back
that evening after the execution and finish off his dessert." 5 But, in the
aggregate, this is far beneath society's radar.
Yet, it is now over fourteen years since the United States Supreme Court
decided a case that purportedly clarified the underlying issues. In Panetti v.
Quarterman, that Court had ruled that such a defendant had a constitutional
right to make a showing that his mental illness "obstruct[ed] a rational
understanding of the State's reason for his execution," 6 thus expanding its
jurisprudence in this area beyond its first modern foray into this area of the
law in Ford v. Wainwright some two decades earlier. Ford had regularly
been interpreted to require that competency-to-be-executed depended only
on three findings: that the prisoner is aware he committed the murders, that
he is going to be executed, and that he is aware of the reasons the State has
given for his execution.
The fourteen years that have passed since the Panetti decision have given
us a body of law that makes clear that, at least in certain jurisdictions, that
case has been paid little more than lip service, and that persons with profound
mental disabilities are still subject to execution (and in some cases, have been
executed). 8 Putting aside cites and references to other aspects of Panetti, 9 the
issue on which the authors are focusing in this Article has, in the fourteen-

s Stephen B. Bright, The Death Penalty as the Answer to Crime: Costly, Counterproductive and
Corrupting, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1069, 1071 (1996) (discussing Rector v. State, 659 S.W.2d 168,
175 (Ark. 1983)).
6 Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 956 (2007). As discussed below, Panetti was a profoundly
mentally ill defendant with "severe, documented mental illness [that was] the source of gross delusions
preventing him from comprehending the meaning and purpose of the punishment to which he has been
sentenced." Id. at 960; see infra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986). As discussed below, Ford suffered from "a severe,
uncontrollable mental disease which closely resembles 'Paranoid Schizophrenia With Suicide
severe enough to substantially affect [defendant's] present
Potential"' -a "major mental disorder ...
ability to assist in the defense of his life." Id. at 402-03; see infra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
8 See, e.g., United States v. Montgomery, 635 F.3d 1074, 1079-80 (8th Cir. 2011) (discussed in this
context in Alison J. Lynch, Michael L. Perlin & Heather Ellis Cucolo, "My Bewildering Brain Toils in
Vain": Traumatic Brain Injury, The Criminal Trial Process, and the Case of Lisa Montgomery, 74
RUTGERS L. REV. 215 (2021)). In five of the nine cases that the Fifth Circuit has decided that involved
those aspects of Panetti that dealt with execution competency, the defendant has been executed. See infra
note 147.
' These cases deal with, variously, questions of successor petitions, when habeas corpus,
procedurally, may be granted (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)), and ripeness of litigation questions.
Panetti, 551 U.S. at 945-47; see, e.g., Magwood v. Paterson, 561 U.S. 320 (2010); Brumfield v. Cain, 576
U.S. 305 (2015); Banister v. Davis, 140 S. Ct. 1698 (2020); Halprin v. Davis, 140 S. Ct. 1200 (2020);
White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415 (2014); Johnson v. Williams, 568 U.S. 289 (2013); Lafler v. Cooper, 566
U.S. 156 (2012); Johnson v. Bredesen, 558 U.S. 1067 (2009) (separate statement by Stevens, J. and
Breyer, J. on denial of certiorari); see also McDonough v. Smith, 139 S. Ct. 2149, 2158-59 (2019)
(discussing non-death penalty case citing Panetti, 551 U.S. at 930).
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plus years since the case was decided, only been cited in Supreme Court cases
a handful of times: in Madison v. Alabama; 10 on the impact of a death row
prisoner's cognitive impairment on executability;1 1 in dissents from denial of
certiorari in two cases in which such individuals alleged that Panetti applied
to their cases; 12 on the question of the applicability of the death penalty to a
non-murder case; 13 and, in one case, simply a cite to its holding. 14
This Article is the third in a trilogy that the authors (MLP & TRH) have
written on how the Fifth Circuit has interpreted Supreme Court cases in the
context of defendants with mental disabilities facing the death penalty. 15 In
the prior articles, there was little doubt as to the conclusions reached by the
authors. In an article that dealt with interpretations of the Court's decision in
Atkins v. Virginia,16 which found that it violated the Eighth Amendment to

'0 Madison v. Alabama, 139 S. Ct. 718 (2019); see also Dunn v. Madison, 138 S. Ct. 9 (2018); Cassidy
Young, Blurred Lines: How to Rationally Understand the "Rational Understanding" Doctrine after
Madison v. Alabama, 48 PEPP. L. REV. 497, 511 (2021) (reporting how the "ambiguities" of Panetti
"resurfaced" in Madison); Marie A. MacCune, Forget Me Not: Exploring American Death Penalty
Jurisprudenceand Dementia in Light of Madison v. Alabama, 54 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 131, 141 (2021)
(analyzing how Madison "incorrectly" applied Panetti).
" Madison, 139 S. Ct. at 724.
12 United States v. Higgs, 141 S. Ct. 645, 651 (2020) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (rejecting denial of
certiorari); Barr v. Purkey, 140 S. Ct. 2594, 2600 (2020) (Breyer, J. and Ginsburg, J. dissenting) (rejecting
vacation of preliminary injunction).
" Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 442 (2008) (death penalty inapplicable in case involving
juvenile rape where such punishment "would not further retributive purposes.").
1 Ryan v. Gonzales, 568 U.S. 57, 76 n.18 (2013) ("Our opinion today does not implicate the
prohibition against 'carrying out a sentence of death upon a prisoner who is insane."') (citing Panetti, 551
U.S. at 934).
" See Michael L. Perlin, Talia Roitberg Harmon & Sarah Wetzel, "ManIs Opposed to FairPlay":
An EmpiricalAnalysis of How the Fifth CircuitHas Failed to Take Seriously Atkins v. Virginia, 11 WAKE
FOREST J.L. & POL'Y 451 (2021); see also Michael L. Perlin, Talia Roitberg Harmon & Sarah Chatt, "A
World of Steel-Eyed Death":An EmpiricalEvaluationof the Failureof the Strickland Standardto Ensure
Adequate Counsel to Defendants with Mental Disabilities Facing the Death Penalty, 53 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. 261, 296-97 (2020) (both of the prior articles were written with co-authors). The authors chose the
Fifth Circuit because of the high number of death penalty verdicts in the three states Texas (especially),
Mississippi, and Louisiana that make up that Circuit. See, e.g., Alexander Rundlet, Opting for Death:
State Responses to the AEDPA's Opt-In Provisionsand the Need Fora Right to Post-ConvictionCounsel,
1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 661, 678-79 (1999) (discussing the "death-belt states" of Texas, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Georgia, Alabama, and Florida, and the disproportionate number of death sentences handed
down in those states). Other definitions of the "death belt" add South Carolina to this list. See Robert J.
Smith, The Geography of the Death Penalty and Its Ramifications, 92 B.U. L. REV. 227, 230 (2012). It
has been estimated that these states together accounted for over 90% of all executions carried out from
1976 to 2002 (the time that the survey in question was done). See Charles J. Ogletree Jr., Black Man's
Burden: Race and the Death Penalty in America, 81 OR. L. REV. 15, 19 (2002).
16 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (noting testing revealed that Atkins's IQ was 59. Id. at
308.). See Mark E. Olive, The DarylAtkins Story, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 363 (2014). On Atkins

generally, see MICHAEL L. PERLIN & HEATHER ELLIS CUCOLO, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND

CRIMINAL

§ 17-4.2.2

(3d ed. 2016) (Autumn 2021 update).
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subject persons with intellectual disabilities1 7 to the death penalty," the
authors said this:
The database we have considered here is infinitely depressing. There was
only actual relief in 12.4% of the cases that raised Atkins issues, and this
grouping of nine cases includes two in which the defendant died before the
final relief could be implemented. What it reveals is a Court with little or
no interest in the thoughtful opinions of Justice Stevens in Atkins and of
Justice Kennedy in Hall [v. Florida]. The science is ignored, and the
jurisprudence is ignored. Baseless fears of undetected malingering, the
mindless use of lay stereotypes of what "looks like" remorse, and the
corrupt employment of "ethnic adjustments" to lawlessly raise IQ scores
making certain minority defendants improperly eligible for execution all are
reflected in the cases decided by the Fifth Circuit.19

And, in the earlier article evaluating Fifth Circuit decisions in the context
of Strickland v. Washington's20 "pallid" adequacy-of-counsel standard,21 the
authors were even more critical. They found the Fifth Circuit's corpus in this
area of the law to be "bizarre and frightening," 2 2 noting that, "in virtually all
cases, Strickland errors-often egregious errors-were ignored, and in over
a third of the cases in which they were acknowledged, defense counsel had
confessed error,"23 concluding that this cohort of cases was "an
embarrassment to our system of criminal law and procedure." 24

" At the time of the Atkins case, the phrase "mental retardation" was used. Twelve years later, in the
case of Hall v. Florida, the Court chose to use the phrase "intellectual disability" rather than "mental
retardation" in all future cases to conform with changes in the U.S. Code and in the most recent version
of the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM5). Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 704-05 (2014).
18 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 ("Construing and applying the Eighth Amendment in the light of our
'evolving standards of decency,' we therefore conclude that such punishment is excessive and that the
Constitution 'places a substantive restriction on the State's power to take the life' of a mentally retarded
offender" (citing Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 321 (1986))).
' Perlin, Harmon & Wetzel, supra note 15, at 497.
20 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
21 Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch,
"My Brain Is So Wired": Neuroimaging's Role in
Competency Cases Involving Persons with Mental Disabilities,27 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 73, 92-93 (2018)
[hereinafter Perlin & Lynch, My Brain]. For a lengthy consideration of Strickland in cases involving
defendants with serious mental disabilities facing the death penalty, see PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY AND
THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 1, at 123-38. On representation in such cases in the Fifth Circuit in
particular, see Perlin, Harmon & Chatt, supra note 15. One of the co-authors of this article, MLP, "second
sat" the Strickland case at the U.S. Supreme Court.
22 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE DEATH PENALTY, supra
note 1, at 308.
23 Id.
2

Id. at 309.

2022]

"Insanity is Smashing Up Against My Soul"

561

Here, the authors complete their trilogy by considering all Fifth Circuit
cases and certain cases from the federal district courts within the Fifth Circuit
25
that have interpreted Panetti.
And the current findings are, perhaps, even
more astonishing than were the authors' earlier findings in the Strickland
article and the Atkins article. What an exhaustive review of the case law
reveals is this: There has not been a single case decided by the Fifth Circuit
in the fourteen years since Panettiin which that Circuit found that a defendant
was not competent to be executed.26 In two district court cases that were not
appealed by the state, Billiot v. Epps7 and Aldridge v. Thaler,28 there were
such findings, 29 but these two are the only reported federal cases in any Fifth
Circuit jurisdiction that determined a defendant was incompetent for these
purposes.30
There is a grotesque irony here in that, as the authors discuss more
extensively below in Panetti's application for certiorari, his lawyers had told
the Supreme Court that, subsequent to the Ford decision, the Fifth Circuit
had not found a single death row defendant (of an n of at least 360) to be

21 See, e.g., Rivera v. Quarterman, 505 F.3d 349 (5th Cir. 2007); Wiley v. Epps, 625 F.3d 199 (5th
Cir. 2010); Hines v. Thaler, 456 Fed. App'x. 357 (5th Cir. 2011) (explaining application of Panettiin the
Atkins context). In a subsequent article, the authors are planning on expanding the current inquiry into a
nationwide investigation of the actual impact of Panettion all federal circuits.
26 See infra notes 147-53.
27

Billiot v. Epps, 671 F. Supp. 2d 840 (S.D. Miss. 2009), amended, 2010 WL 1490298 (S.D. Miss.

2010).
Aldridge v. Thaler, No. H-05-6082010, WL 1050335 (S.D. Tex. 2010).
Billiot, 671 F. Supp. 2d at 883.
30 In three cases, state courts within the Fifth Circuit have found defendants to be incompetent to be
executed per Panetti. See, e.g., Staley v. State, 420 S.W.3d 785, 786 (Tex. Crim. Ct. App. 2013), discussed
infra note 95; Mays v. State, 476 S.W.3d 454 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 2015), vacated, No. AP-77,055, 2019
WL 2361999 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 2019) (initial order reinstated in unpublished opinion, see infra note
151); Druery v. State, 412 S.W.3d 523 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 2013) (defendant made substantial showing
of incompetency to be executed). In Ex parte Green, the court stayed the defendant's execution on
incompetency grounds, but, after further litigation, he was found competent to be executed, and that
execution was carried out. Ex Parte Green, No. AP-76,374, 2010 WL 11566377 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App.
2010). In Turner v. State, the court remanded the defendant's case following a death penalty verdict
for a retrospective competency hearing. Turner v. State, 422 S.W.3d 676 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 2013). For
further proceedings, see Turner v. State, No. AP-76,580, 2017 WL 2571546 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 2017).
Subsequently, the defendant was found guilty of capital murder, but was sentenced to life in prison. See
Claire Goodman, Ex-Rosenberg Death Row Inmate Sentenced to Life in Prison after Retrial for Double
Homicide, HOUSTON CHRON. (Sept. 20, 2021, 10:27 AM), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/
neighborhood/sugarland/article/Former-Rosenberg-death-row-inmate-sentenced-to-16473049.php
[https://perma.cc/WVB7-T52V]. For other district court cases that were not appealed to the Fifth Circuit,
see infra note 144. For other state court cases in the states within the Fifth Circuit that have cited Panetti,
see infra note 145.
28

29
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incompetent to be executed.31 Almost beyond belief, in the fourteen-plus
years since the Panetti decision, there has been no change in those findings.
This Article will proceed in this manner: first, the authors consider the
historical roots of the prohibition on the execution of the "currently insane,"
looking, in this context, at an important predecessor case, Ford v.
Wainwright,32 in which a fractured Court concluded that the Eighth
Amendment did prohibit the imposition of the death penalty on an "insane"
prisoner,33 but in an opinion that left significant confusion as to its scope.34
Then the bizarre facts and circumstances of Panetti are considered.35 Next,
the authors demonstrate how the Fifth Circuit has basically ignored the
Panetti decision and failed to give it life. 36 Following this, therapeutic
jurisprudence principles are applied in an effort to determine the extent to
which the legal system can be a therapeutic agent in cases such as the ones
under discussion here. The authors conclude with some suggestions for at
least partial amelioration of this broken system.
The title of this Article incorporates a Bob Dylan lyric from the
picaresque-and rarely performed-song Highlands,37 from the much
acclaimed 1997 album Time Out of Mind. A few couplets later in the same
song, Dylan sings:
Well, I'm lost somewhere
I must have made a few bad turns 38
Certainly, this applies to the population under discussion here. 39 In his
analysis of this song, a leading Dylan critic, Tony Attwood, notes that the

3

Michael L. Perlin, "Merchants and Thieves, Hungry for Power": ProsecutorialMisconduct and

&

PassiveJudicial Complicity in Death Penalty Trialsof Defendants with Mental Disabilities,73 WASH.

LEE L. REV. 1501, 1534-35 (2016) [hereinafter Perlin, Merchants and Thieves] (quoting Petition for Writ
of Certiorari, Panetti, No. 06-6407, 2006 WL 3880284, at *26).
32 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
33 Id. at 405-10.
3
In a prior work, co-author MLP noted "a continued failure on the part of many courts to
authentically implement the Forddecision." MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL § 12-4.le, at 543 (2d ed. 2002).
3 This important collateral question must also be considered here: does a death row defendant have
the right to refuse medication that would make him competent to be executed? The law, to be charitable,
is muddled. See infra section IV.B.2.c.
36 Co-author MLP used this phrase in the title of an earlier article about Atkins v. Virginia. See Michael
L. Perlin, "Life Is in Mirrors, Death Disappears":Giving Life to Atkins, 33 N. MEX. L. REV. 315 (2003).
37 BOB DYLAN, HIGHLANDS (Criteria Studios 1997).
38

Id.

See David Weir, Highlands, BOB DYLAN SONG ANALYSIS (Sept. 30, 2016), https://
bobdylansonganalysis.wordpress.com/2016/09/30/highlands/comment-page-1/
[https://perma.cc/XC423
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verse in question shows that "nothing is connected." 40 One of the major
critical interpretations concludes, on the point of the lyric on which the
authors draw for their title, "by treating insanity as something external to him
[, the narrator] can distance himself from it as if rectifying it is no concern of
his." 41 To the Fifth Circuit, the death row inmate's severe mental illness is of
"no concern," and is a great shame of the legal system.
I.

HISTORICAL RooTS

42

The issue of whether "insane" persons 43 can be executed "has plagued
the legal system for centuries." 44 Blackstone, Hale, and Coke all specifically
opposed such execution, 45 and, nearly a century ago, Dr. William White
focused on the "general feeling of abhorrence against executing a person who
is insane." 46 Notwithstanding this history, as recently as the mid-1980s,
Professor Elyse Zenoff noted, "no consensus exists about the reasons for it,
about the meaning of 'insane' in this context, or the procedures which should
be used to determine it." 47 It is no wonder that, at about the same time, Dr.
Paul Appelbaum aptly characterized this question as "one of the more
perplexing issues in criminal justice today." 4
The Supreme Court had rejected as recently as 1950 the argument that
there was a due process right to a pre-execution judicial sanity

ZQLZ] (on the ambiguity of whether it is the narrator's soul or his "insanity" thought to be in the process
of being destroyed).
4 Tony Attwood, Bob Dylan's "Highlands"; Its Origins in Burns Poetry, and a Beautiful Rare
Reworking in Concert, UNTOLD DYLAN (Dec. 21, 2008), https://bob-dylan.org.uk/archives/41.
41 Weir, supra note 39.
42 See generally PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 16, § 17- 4.1.1, at 17-63 and 17-65.
43 In this context, this refers to persons with serious mental illness, not those who have successfully
pled an insanity defense.
44 PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 16, § 17-4.1.1, at 17-63.
4' Geoffrey C. Hazard & David W. Louisell, Death, the State, and the Insane: Stay of Execution, 9
UCLA L. REV. 381, 383-85 (1962) (citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *395-*96 (13th ed.
1800); 1 MATTHEW HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 34-35 (1736); and EDWARD COKE, THIRD INSTITUTE

6 (1797)).
46 WILLIAM WHITE, INSANITY AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 245 (1981).

' Elyce Zenoff, Can an Insane Person Be Executed?, 1985-1986 PREVIEW U.S. SUP. CT. CASES 465,
466 (1986) (suggesting Professor Zenoff's graphic representation of the various policy arguments both in
support of and in opposition to such a ban).
48 Paul Appelbaum, Competence to Be Executed: Another Conundrum for Mental Health
Professionals,37 HOSP. & COMMUN. PSYCHIATRY 682 (1986) (on the range of ethical questions raised
for psychiatrists in this context the responsibility of psychiatrists to construe appropriately the key terms
in operative statutes, assessment of the appropriate standard of proof, reliability of diagnoses, and
possibility of regression between evaluation and execution); see also PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 16,
§ 17-4.1.2, at 17-65 to 17-69.
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determination. 49 That decision, though, predated by twelve years the court's
incorporation of the Eighth Amendment to be applied to the states, 50 so it was
not until its decision in Ford v. Wainwright5 1 in 1986 that the "modern"
Supreme Court struggled with this issue.52
After a treating psychiatrist concluded that Ford suffered from "a severe,
uncontrollable mental disease which closely resembles 'Paranoid
Schizophrenia With Suicide Potential'"-a "major mental disorder ... severe
enough to substantially affect [defendant's] present ability to assist in the
defense of his life [,]" 53 Ford's counsel invoked Florida procedures governing
the determination of competency of an inmate sentenced to death. 54
Examining psychiatrists found him to have sufficient capacity to be executed
under state law,55 and the governor subsequently signed the death warrant. 56
Counsel then applied for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court, seeking
an evidentiary hearing on his sanity, "proffering the conflicting findings of
the Governor-appointed commission and subsequent challenges to their
methods by other psychiatrists." 57 After a divided panel of the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the writ, 58 a fractured Supreme

Court reversed and subsequently remanded for a new trial. 59
In the only portion of any of the four separate opinions to command a
majority of the Court, Justice Marshall concluded that the Eighth
Amendment did prohibit the imposition of the death penalty on an insane
prisoner.60 In seeking "objective evidence of contemporary values [so as to
determine] whether a particular punishment comports with the fundamental
human dignity that the Amendment protects," 61 Justice Marshall concluded

4 Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 17-19 (1950).
* Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
' Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986). See also PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 16, § 17-4.1.3,
at 17-69 to 17-80.
52 Alvin Ford had been convicted in 1974 of murdering a police officer during an attempted robbery,
and was sentenced to death. Ford, 477 U.S. at 401. While there was no suggestion that he was incompetent
at the time of the offense, his trial, or his sentencing, he began to manifest behavioral changes in 1982,
nearly eight years after his conviction, developing delusions and hallucinations. Id. at 402. He wrote
letters focusing on the local activities of the Ku Klux Klan that revealed "an increasingly pervasive
delusion that he had become the target of a complex conspiracy, involving the Klan and assorted others,
designed to force him to commit suicide." Id.
" Id. at 402-03.
5 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 922.07 (West 1985).
5 Ford, 477 U.S. at 404.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Ford v. Wainwright, 752 F.2d 526 (11th Cir. 1985).
5
Ford, 477 U.S. at 399.
0 Ford, 477 U.S. at 405-10.
61 Id. at 406 (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) (plurality opinion)).
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that it was "clear that the ancient and humane limitation upon the State's
ability to execute its sentences has as firm a hold upon the jurisprudence of
today as it had centuries ago in England." 62
The opinion left it to states to develop appropriate procedures "to enforce
the constitutional restriction upon its execution of sentences," 63 noting that it
was not suggesting that "only a full trial on the issue of sanity will suffice to
protect the federal interests." 64 The "lodestar" of any such procedures "must
be the overriding dual imperative of providing redress for those with
substantial claims and of encouraging accuracy in the factfinding
determination," 65 concluding that the defendant was entitled under the habeas
corpus statute to a de novo evidentiary hearing on the question of his
competence to be executed.66
Some thirty years ago, one of the authors (MLP) wrote that "Fordserved
as a paradigm for the Supreme Court's confusion and, to some extent, its use
of rationalization as a means of dealing with many of the cases it has decided
in the past several decades dealing with mentally disabled criminal
defendants." 67 It is clear that-standing alone-Ford had little "carryover"
impact: A study of the aftermath of the Ford case some six years after the
decision glumly concluded that, despite the decision in that litigation, "it
remains all but impossible" for defense counsel to prove that a death row
client is incompetent to be executed.68
In the next section, Panetti is discussed at length in an effort to
understand how it changed the Ford standard, and how, if at all, this new
statement of the law affected the cohort of cases under discussion here.

62 Id. at 409. On the question of what procedures were appropriate in such a case, the Court was
sufficiently fragmented that no opinion commanded a majority of justices. In a four-Justice opinion,
Justice Marshall concluded that, under the federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and Townsend
v. Sam, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), a de novo evidentiary hearing on Ford's sanity was required, unless "the
state-court trier of fact has after a full hearing reliably found the relevant facts." Id. at 312-13.
63 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 416-17 (1986).
6 Id. at 416.
65 Id. at 417.
66 Id. at 417-18. Justice Powell concurred, joining fully in the majority's opinion on the substantive

&

Eighth Amendment issue. Id. at 418. But he differed substantially from Justice Marshall's opinion on the
issue
of the
appropriate
procedures
which
states
must follow
pursuant
to the
habeas statute. Writing for herself and Justice White, Justice O'Connor concurred in part and dissented in
part. Id. at 427. Finally, Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger dissented. Id. at 431.
67 PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 16, § 17-4.1.4; see also Michael L. Perlin, The Supreme Court, the
Mentally Disabled CriminalDefendant, and Symbolic Values: Random Decisions, Hidden Rationales, or
DoctrinalAbyss?, 29 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 78-98 (1987).
68 See Michael L. Radelet & Kent S. Miller, The Aftermath of Ford v. Wainwright, 10 BEHAV. SCI.
L. 339 (1992); see also John H. Blume et al., Killing the Oblivious: An EmpiricalStudy of Competency to
Be Executed Litigation, 82 UMKC L. REV. 335 (2014). On pre-Panettilitigation on this issue, see PERLIN
& CUCOLO, supra note 16, § 17-4.1.5, at 17-85 to 17-88.
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THE PANETTI CASE

Scott Panetti, who was convicted of capital murder in the slayings of his
estranged wife's parents, had been hospitalized numerous times for serious
psychiatric disorders. 69 Notwithstanding his "'bizarre,' 'scary,' and 'trancelike"' behavior, 70 he was found competent to stand trial and competent to
waive counsel.7 1 The jury rejected his insanity defense, and he was sentenced
to death.7 2 Following the exhaustion of state remedies and the dismissal of
an earlier habeas corpus petition, Panetti filed a subsequent petition, alleging
that he did not understand the reasons for his pending execution.73
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the denial of the writ,74 and the Supreme Court
reversed.75 Its opinion elaborated on the Ford opinion in two different ways:
on the procedures to be afforded to a defendant seeking to assert a Fordclaim,
and on the substance of the Ford standard. 76 First, the Court found error in
the trial court's failure to provide the defendant an adequate opportunity to
submit expert evidence in response to the report filed by the court-appointed
experts,77 thus depriving him of his "constitutionally adequate opportunity to
be heard. "78

69

Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 936 (2007).

70 Id. at 936. According to Panetti's stand-by counsel, his trial was a "judicial farce." Panetti v.

Stephens, 727 F.3d 398, 400 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Panetti, 551 U.S. at 936.).
7' Panetti, 551 U.S. at 936. See, e.g., J. Amy Dillard, Madness Alone Punishes the Madman: The
Search for Moral Dignity in the Court's Competency Doctrine as Applied in Capital Cases, 79 TENN. L.
REv. 461 (2012). At his trial, Panetti, who wore a purple cowboy outfit, applied for more than two hundred
subpoenas, requested testimony from, among others, John F. Kennedy, the Pope, and Jesus Christ. Brief
for Petitioner at 11-16, Panetti, v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007) (No. 06-6407).
72 Panetti, 551 U.S. at 937.

3 Id.
4 Panetti

v. Dretke, 448 F.3d 815 (5th Cir. 2006), aff'g 401 F. Supp. 2d 702, 711 (W.D. Tex. 2004).
On the way the Fifth Circuit has dealt with cases involving persons with mental disabilities sentenced to
death, see Perlin, Harmon & Chatt, supra note 15 (cases construing Strickland v. Washington, 446 U.S.
668 (1984)), and Perlin, Harmon & Wetzel, supra note 15 (cases construing Atkins v. Virginia, 563 U.S.

304 (2002)).
5 Panetti, 551 U.S. at 962.
76 Id.
7

Id. at 949.

78 Id. The fact-finding procedures on which the trial court relied, it concluded, were "'not adequate

for reaching reasonably correct results' or, at a minimum, resulted in a process that appeared to be
'seriously inadequate for the ascertainment of the truth."' Id. at 954 (quoting, in part, Ford v. Wainwright,
477 U.S. 399, 423-24 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)). The question
of access to expert evidence permeates the cohort of Fifth Circuit opinions we consider in this part. See
infra section IV.B.2.a. On the significance of this aspect of the Court's holding, see Michael L. Perlin,

"Good and Bad, I Defined These Terms, Quite Clear No Doubt Somehow": Neuroimaging and
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On the second, it elaborated upon and clarified Ford.79 Here, it rejected
the Court of Appeals' interpretation of the Ford standard: that competencyto-be-executed depends only on three findings: that the prisoner is aware he
committed the murders, that he is going to be executed, and that he is aware
of the reasons the State has given for his execution.80 Such an interpretation
of Ford unconstitutionally foreclosed the defendant from establishing
incompetency by the means that Panetti sought to employ in the case at bar:
by making a showing that his mental illness "obstruct[ed] a rational
understanding of the State's reason for his execution." 1 The Fifth Circuit's
position was "too restrictive to afford a prisoner the protections granted by
the Eighth Amendment." 8 2
A prisoner's delusions were not irrelevant to his "'comprehen[sion]' or
'aware[ness]' if they so impaired the prisoner's concept of reality that he
could not reach a rational understanding of the reason for the execution. "83
Executing an insane person, the Panetti majority concluded, "serves no
retributive purpose":84
[I]t might be said that capital punishment is imposed because it has the
potential to make the offender recognize at last the gravity of his crime and
to allow the community as a whole, including the surviving family and
friends of the victim, to affirm its own judgment that the culpability of the
prisoner is so serious that the ultimate penalty must be sought and imposed.
The potential for a prisoner's recognition of the severity of the offense and
the objective of community vindication are called in question, however, if
the prisoner's mental state is so distorted by a mental illness that his
awareness of the crime and punishment has little or no relation to the
understanding of those concepts shared by the community as a whole. This
problem is not necessarily overcome once the test set forth by the Court of

Competency to be Executed after Panetti, 28 BEHAv. SCI. & L. 671, 679 (2010) [hereinafter Perlin, Good
and Bad].
7 Panetti, 551 U.S. at 956.
80 Id. (quoting Panetti v. Dretke, 448 F.3d 815, 819 (5th Cir. 2006), aff'g 401 F. Supp. 2d 702, 711
(W.D. Tex. 2004)).
81 Id. (emphasis added). The Court reviewed the testimony that demonstrated the defendant's "fixed
delusion" system and approved of expert testimony that had pointed out that "an unmedicated individual
suffering from schizophrenia can 'at times' hold an ordinary conversation and that 'it depends [whether
the discussion concerns the individual's] fixed delusional system."' Id. at 955. On the difficulties of
assessing this "rational understanding," see Katie Arnold, The Challenge of "Rationally Understanding"a
Schizophrenic's Delusions: An Analysis ofScott Panetti's Subsequent Habeas Proceedings, 50 TULSA L. REv. 243,
251 (2014).
82 Panetti, 551 U.S. at 956-57.
83 Id. at 958.
84 Id. at 958 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 408 (1986)).
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Appeals is met. And under a similar logic the other rationales set forth by
Ford fail to align with the distinctions drawn by the Court of Appeals. 85

Merely being able to identify the stated reason for execution does not
foreclose a prisoner from demonstrating incompetency. 86 The Court stressed,
"[t]he beginning of doubt about competence in a case like petitioner's is not
a misanthropic personality or an amoral character. It is a psychotic
disorder." 87 Here, Panetti's "severe, documented mental illness [was] the
source of gross delusions preventing him from comprehending the meaning
and purpose of the punishment to which he has been sentenced." 88 The Court
then remanded so that the "underpinnings of petitioner's claims [could] be
explained and evaluated in further detail." 89
As Professor Stephen Morse has recently noted in this context, "[i]t is
unfair and offensive to the dignity of criminal justice to treat people without
understanding as if their understanding was unimpaired." 90 Although a recent
article suggests that, "[a]s the Court's wording suggests, moral values and
the intuition that certain punishments 'simply offend [] humanity' are the
animating forces behind Panetti'sstandard," 91 as discussed below, it does not
appear that the Fifth Circuit has paid any attention to these "animating
forces."

85

92

Id. at 958-59.

86 Id.

s' Id. at 960.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 962. Justice Thomas dissented (for himself, the Chief Justice, and
Justices Scalia and Alito),
characterizing Panetti's submissions to the trial court on the competency question as "meager." Id. at 974.
He also criticizes the majority's opinion as a "half-baked holding" that "thrust[s] already muddled Ford
determinations into ... disarray." Id. at 978. Litigation in the Panetticase still continues. See Ex parte
Panetti, No. WR-37,145-05, 2021 WL 2560138 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 2021), denying his then-most recent
application for a writ of habeas corpus. Four years prior to this decision, the Fifth Circuit had reversed a
district court order that had denied Panetti's motion for counsel and expert assistance as part of the process
of determining his current competence to be executed. See Panetti v. Stephens, 863 F.3d 366 (5th Cir.
2017).
9 Stephen J. Morse, Internal and External Challenges to Culpability, 53 ARIz. ST. L.J. 617, 642
(2021).
" Elias Feldman, Memory, Moral Reasoning, and Madison v. Alabama, 37 TouRO L. REv. 105, 11112(2021).
92 The authors believe that the remand opinion by the Fifth Circuit in 2017 Panetti v. Stephens is
the only opinion in any case in that Circuit in which a seriously mentally ill death row inmate was
successful at any point in any proceedings on this issue. Perhaps this should not surprise the authors too
much. See Blume et al., supra note 68, at 355 (suggesting the Ford/Panettistandard is "stringent in theory
and very difficult to satisfy in practice."). On how procedural mechanisms like the allocation of the burden
of proof and presumptions of competency "have stripped Panetti of much of its force," see Jonathan
Greenberg, For Every Action There Is A Reaction: The Procedural Pushback Against Panetti v.
Quarterman, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 227 (2012).
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The authors next turn to a collateral issue that, although never addressed
by the Supreme Court directly in Panetti,has been of significance in multiple
post-Panetti cases: the right of a death row defendant to refuse medication
designed to make him competent to be executed. 93
A.

Involuntary Medication and Competency to Be Executed94

In this context, it is necessary to also consider a question that permeates
this area of law: whether a state can involuntarily medicate an individual
facing a death sentence to make him competent to be executed. 95 As
discussed subsequently, 96 this is an astonishingly muddled area of the law.
There is a split among the states and circuits on this question, and the
curiously, under the
Court has declined-somewhat
Supreme
circumstances-to resolve the question. 97
It appeared, some thirty-one years ago, that the Supreme Court would
address this question, when it initially granted certiorari in Perry v.
Louisiana,98 but it ultimately vacated and remanded the case to the Louisiana
Supreme Court99 for further reconsideration in light of its then-recent
decision in Washington v. Harper,100 on the right of prisoners to refuse
medication, a case it decided about one week prior to its decision to grant
certiorari in Perry.10 1

"

See generally, PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 16, § 17-5, at 17-140 to 17-148.

9 Id.
" This has been considered by a state court (in one of the states within the Fifth Circuit) in an opinion
that construed Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007). See Staley v. State, 420 S.W.3d 785, 786 n.2
(Tex. Crim. Ct. App. 2013) (concluding that then-operative Texas state statute, TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC.
art. 46.05(h), "codifie[d] the constitutional standards" of Panetti, and holding that the trial court "lacked
authority" to order the involuntary medication of a death-row inmate. Id. at 787.). The statutory section
was subsequently repealed by 2021 Texas Senate Bill No. 188, after it was held to be "unconstitutionally
narrow" in Wood v. Quarterman, 572 F. Supp. 2d 814, 818 (W.D. Tex. 2008), vacated sub. nom. Wood
v. Thaler, 787 F. Supp. 2d 458 (W.D. Tex. 2011).
96 See infra notes 102-13 and accompanying text.
9
Such cases are sometimes categorized as involving the issue of synthetic competency. See, e.g.,
Basso v. Stephens, No. H-14-213, 2014 WL 412549, at *6 (S.D. Tex. 2014). See generally Theodore Y.
Blumoff, On Executing Treatment-Resistant Schizophrenics: Identity and the Construction of "Synthetic"
Competency, 52 CRIM. L. BULL. 308 (2016).
98 Perry v. Louisiana, 494 U.S. 1015 (1990).
9 Perry v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 38 (1990), reh'g denied, 498 U.S. 1075 (1991).
'0
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990). See generally PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 16, § 87.1.
'"' Harper,494 U.S. 210.
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Consider the facts of Perry. Perry had been charged with the murder of
five family members, including his parents. 102 After he was found competent
to stand trial, Perry withdrew his previously entered not guilty by reason of
insanity plea (over counsel's advice) and entered a not guilty plea. 103 He was
convicted and sentenced to death. 14 On appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court
affirmed both his conviction and death sentence but ordered an adversarial
hearing on his then-present competence to be executed. 105
At that competency hearing, the four expert witnesses agreed that Perry
was psychotic and that his condition improved when he was properly
medicated. 106 Two of the witnesses found that he would be competent to be
executed if he were to receive medication; a third witness, who did not
believe Perry understood the purpose of his sentence, was not sure if the
medication would make him competent. The fourth witness remained
unconvinced that the defendant understood that he had really committed the
murders in question. 107
At a subsequent hearing (held five months later), testimony was adduced
that Perry was now aware of the reason he was to be executed. 108 In ordering
his execution, the trial court found that any due process right to refuse
medication that Perry might have had was outweighed by two compelling
state interests: the provision of proper psychiatric care, and carrying out a
valid death penalty, and ordered that Perry be medicated-by force if
necessary-so that he would remain competent to be executed.109 The
Supreme Court then granted certiorari, but vacated and remanded in light of
11
its decision in Harper.

0

102 State v. Perry, 502 So. 2d 543, 546 (La. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 872 (1987), reh'g denied,
484 U.S. 992 (1987).
' Id. at 547.
104 Id. at 545.
105 Id. at 563-64.
106 Brief for Petitioner at 23, Perry v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 38 (1990) (No. 89-5120), 1989 WL 1127448,
at *23.
10 Id.
108

Id.

109 Id. The Louisiana Supreme Court declined to review this order. 543 So. 2d 487 (La.), reh'g denied,

545 So. 2d 1049 (1989).
110

Id.
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On remand, the Louisiana Supreme Court found, under state
constitutional law, 111 that the State was prohibited from medicating Perry to
make him competent to be executed.1 1 2 The court concluded:
For centuries no jurisdiction has approved the execution of the insane. The
state's attempt to circumvent this well-settled prohibition by forcibly
medicating an insane prisoner with antipsychotic drugs violates his rights
under our state constitution. . . . First, it violates his right to privacy or
personhood. Such involuntary medication requires the unjustified invasion
of his brain and body with discomforting, potentially dangerous and painful
drugs, the seizure of control of his mind and thoughts, and the usurpation of
his right to make decisions regarding his health or medical treatment.
Furthermore, implementation of the state's plan to medicate forcibly and
execute the insane prisoner would constitute cruel, excessive and unusual
punishment. This particular application of the death penalty fails to
measurably contribute to the social goals of capital punishment. Carrying
out this punitive scheme would add severity and indignity to the prisoner's
punishment beyond that required for the mere extinguishment of life. This
type of punitive treatment system is not accepted anywhere in contemporary
society and is apt to be administered erroneously, arbitrarily or
capriciously.11 3

Since Perry, the Supreme Court has not revisited this question.11 4
However, there have been multiple other decisions in conflict with each
other.1 1 5 The South Carolina Supreme Court relied upon the Louisiana

Supreme Court's decision in Perry to support its conclusion that medicating
a defendant to make him competent to be executed would violate the South
Carolina state constitution.116 On the other hand, in Singleton v. Norris,11 7
the Arkansas Supreme Court ruled that the state had the burden to administer
antipsychotic medication as long as the prisoner was alive and was a potential
danger either to himself or to others, and that the collateral effect of the

See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, State Constitutions and Statutes as Sources of Rights for the Mentally
Disabled: The Last Frontier?, 20 LOYOLA L.A. L. REv. 1249 (1987); Katie Eyer, Litigatingfor Treatment:
The Use of State Laws and Constitutions in Obtaining Treatment Rights for Individuals with Mental
Illness, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1 (2003) (both explaining how state constitutional law can be
relied upon to provide more rights than are available under the federal constitution even if the two
constitutional provisions in question are worded identically).
12 State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746 (La. 1992).
"3 Id. at 747-48. This decision was not re-appealed to the United States Supreme Court (no doubt
because of its basis in state constitutional law).
"4 See PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 16, at § 17-5.1.7, at 143.
"s Singleton v. State, 437 S.E.2d 53, 60-62 (S.C. 1993).
116 Id.
"' Singleton v. Norris, 992 S.w.2d 768 (Ark. 1999).
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involuntary medication-rendering him competent to understand the nature
and reason for his execution-did not violate due process. 1 8 The Supreme
Court subsequently denied certiorari. 119
Following the denial of Singleton's habeas corpus petition, the Eighth
Circuit ruled that neither due process nor the Eighth Amendment prevented
the state from executing an inmate who had regained competency as the result
of forced medication that is part of "appropriate medical care." 120 In coming
to its decision, the Court observed that Singleton had proposed no less
intrusive means of insuring his competence and never argued that he was not
competent with the medication-other than to put forth what the Court
termed his "'artificial competence' theory."12 1 In addressing the defendant's
key claims, the Court reasoned:
Singleton's argument regarding his long-term medical interest boils down
to an assertion that execution is not in his medical interest. Eligibility for
execution is the only unwanted consequence of the medication. The due
process interests in life and liberty that Singleton asserts have been
foreclosed by the lawfully imposed sentence of execution and the Harper
procedure. In the circumstances presented in this case, the best medical
interests of the prisoner must be determined without regard to whether there
is a pending date of execution. Thus, we hold that the mandatory medication
regime, valid under the pendency of a stay of execution, does not become
unconstitutional under Harper when an execution date is set. 122

The Court also rejected Singleton's claim, based on State v. Perry, that
the Eight Amendment prohibited execution of one who is made "artificially
competent." 12 3 In a dissenting opinion, Judge Heaney stated, "I believe that
to execute a man who is severely deranged without treatment, and arguably
incompetent when treated, is the pinnacle of what Justice Marshall called 'the
barbarity of exacting mindless vengeance.'"14

118 Id. at770.
"9 Singleton v. Norris, 528 U.S. 1084 (2000).
120 Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1027 (8th Cir. 2003), cert den., 540 U.S. 832 (2003).
121 Id. at 1025.
122 Id. at 1026.
123 Id. at 1027.
"
Id. at 1030 (quoting Ford. v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986)). Judge Heaney further gives
examples of Singleton's beliefs regarding death, including the belief that his victim was not truly dead
and that a person can be executed by correctional officers and then have his breathing "started up again"
by judges. Id. at 1034. The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. Singleton v. Norris, 540 U.S. 832 (2003).
After more than twenty years on death row, Singleton was executed in January 2004. See Charles Laverne

Singleton, CLARK CNTY. PROSECUTING ATTORNEY'S OFF. http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/html/death/

US/singleton887.htm [https://perma.cc/5Q2R-CFVF].
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Several years later, in an earlier aspect of the Panetti case, the Fifth
Circuit had found that a medicated defendant (in that case, Panetti) was
competent to be executed. 125 There, it affirmed a decision of the district court
that had found that the defendant both suffered from schizoaffective disorder
and had a "'delusional belief system in which he viewed himself as being
persecuted for his religious activities and beliefs,"' believing that the State is
"'in league with the forces of evil to prevent him from preaching the
Gospel."' 126 Nonetheless, as the defendant was aware that he was to be
executed, that he had committed the murders for which he was convicted and
sentenced to death, and that the "'State's stated reason for executing him is
that he committed two murders[,]"' the district court held that Panetti was
competent to be executed.127 Although the Supreme Court subsequently
granted certiorari, its merits decision did not discuss the issue of involuntary
medication, so this question remains unresolved. 128

125 Panetti v. Dretke, 448 F.3d 815 (5th Cir. 2006). For a somewhat muddled earlier
decision involving
an attempted challenge to ad-hoc procedures in Texas for determining competency to be executed, see
Kemp v. Cockrell, No. 3:00-CV-2044-H, 2003 WL 21394632 (N.D. Tex. 2003). Due process claims were
procedurally barred, petitioner had no right to counsel or expert assistance under Ake v. Oklahoma, 470
U.S. 68, 74 (1985), and the issue of competency to be executed was not ripe because no execution date
had been pending; see also infra notes 130-32 and accompanying text; see also Ex Parte Staley, No. WR37,034-05, 2012 WL 1882267 (Texas Ct. Crim. App. 2012) (describing subsequent Texas decision staying
defendant's execution, in part, as a result of his assertion that forced medication violates the constitutional
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment); see also Megan A. Rusciano, Situating Staley:
Investigating the Constitutionality of Forcibly Medicating a Texas Death Row Inmate to Render Him
Competent for Execution, 21 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POLY & L. 893 (2013); see also supra note 97; see
also Brian D. Shannon & Victor R. Scarano, Incompetency to Be Executed: Continuing Ethical Challenges
& Time for a Change in Texas, 45 TEX. TECH L. REV. 410 (2013) (reporting on Texas procedures in
general); see also supra note 7 and infra notes 153, 269 (the issue of ripeness under Panetti is regularly
litigated in a variety of fact contexts).
126 Panetti, 448 F.3d at 817.
127 Id.
128 See Dominic Rupprecht, Compelling Choice: Forcibly Medicating Death Row Inmates
to
Determine Whether They Wish to Pursue Collateral Relief, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 333 (2009) (providing
subsequent reconsiderations of this issue); see also Chinyerum Okpara, Forced into Execution:
Involuntarily Medicating Mentally Ill Inmates to Achieve Competency for Execution, 43 T. MARSHALL L.
REV. ONLINE 2 (2019); see also Anna Trenga, Forcible Medication of Criminal Defendants: to Stand Trial
and to Be Executed, 25 TEMP. POL. & CIv. RTs. L. REV. 265 (2016); see also Douglas Mossman,
Unbuckling the "Chemical Straitjacket": The Legal Significance of Recent Advances in the
Pharmacological Treatment of Psychosis, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1033 (2002).
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UNANSWERED QUESTIONS

First, consider how the less well-known aspect of Panetti (that which
deals with the need for additional expert testimony) has been treated. 129 There
appears to likely be a significant law-practice conflict between the expansive
language in Panetti (seeing a broader role for experts), and the reality as to
how Ake v. Oklahoma130 and its successor opinion, McWilliams v. Dunn,1 3 1
have been construed in the quarter century-plus since Ake was decided. 132
The issue is especially pressing in cases such as Panetti's successors that
inevitably deal with complex mental disability issues often far beyond the
ken of laypersons and always subject to the misinterpretation caused by factfinders' use of false "ordinary common sense."13 3 Significantly, in its
conclusion in Panetti, the Court cited to the American Psychological
Association's amicus brief (that had discussed the ways that experts can

129 The issue of funding for experts appears multiple times in the cohort of Fifth Circuit post-Panetti
opinions. See infra section IV.B.2.a.
"1 Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74 (1985) (discussing indigent defendant's right to insanity defense

expert); see generally Paul C. Giannelli, Ake v. Oklahoma: The Right to Expert Assistance in a PostDaubert, Post-DNA World, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 1305 (2004).
'3' McWilliams v. Dunn, 137 S. Ct. 1790, 1800 (2017) (expert witness must "help .. . the defense
evaluate the [assigned doctor's] report [and defendant's] medical records and translate these data into a
legal strategy." Id. at 1792.). The role of experts and the quality of experts has been a key element of some
of the post-PanettiFifth Circuit cases. See infra section IV.B.2.a; see also Michael L. Perlin, "Deceived
Me into Thinking/I Had Something to Protect": A Therapeutic JurisprudenceAnalysis of When Multiple
Experts Are Necessary in Cases in Which Fact-finders Rely on Heuristic Reasoning and "Ordinary
Common Sense", 13 L.J. SOC. JUST. 88, 98-99 (2020) [hereinafter Perlin, Deceived Me] (on McWilliams
in this context).
132 See generally Perlin, DeceivedMe, supra note 131, at 116-17 (concluding thatAke and McWilliams
require the appointment of multiple experts in certain cases); see also Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Reclaiming
Equality to Reframe Indigent Defense Reform, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1197, 1246 n.206 (2013) (quoting
Giannelli, supra note 130, at 1311-12 n.36) (for the proposition that Ake implementation has "fall[en] far
short of what is needed.").
133 "Ordinary common sense" is "a powerful unconscious animator of legal decision making that
reflects 'idiosyncratic, reactive decisionmaking,' and is a psychological construct that reflects the level of
the disparity between perception and reality that regularly pervades the judiciary in deciding cases
involving individuals with mental disabilities." Perlin, Harmon & Chatt, supra note 15, at 281 (citing,
inter alia, Michael L. Perlin, Psychodynamics and the Insanity Defense: "OrdinaryCommon Sense" and
Reasoning, 69 NEB. L. REV. 3, 22-23, 29 (1990), and Richard K. Sherwin, Dialects and Dominance: A
Study of Rhetorical Fields in the Law of Confessions, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 729, 737-38 (1988)). See also
Perlin & Lynch, My Brain, supra note 21, at 93-94 ("judges treated biologically-based evidence in
criminal cases involving questions of mental disability law (via privileging and subordination) so as to
conform to the judges' pre-existing positions."). See also Michael L. Perlin, "And I See Through Your
Brain": Access to Experts, Competency to Consent, and the Impact of Antipsychotic Medications in
Neuroimaging Cases in the Criminal Trial Process, 2009 STANFORD TECHNOL. L. J. 1, 21 n.84
[hereinafter Perlin, "And I See Through Your Brain"] (suggesting among the markers of the use of this
false "ordinary common sense" is decisionmaking that reflects these thought patterns: "I see it that way,
therefore everyone sees it that way; I see it that way, therefore that's the way it is.").
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inform competency determinations);134 this citation tells us that a majority of
the Panetti court (albeit a bare majority) was comfortable with and
responsive to a greater role for mental health experts in judicial
proceedings.1 3 5 As discussed below, 136 expert testimony (as to issues of
substance, believability, and funding) was critical in several of the postPanetti cases considered here.
It is essential, the authors believe, to study post-Panetticases in an effort
to determine to what extent, if any, these questions have been addressed, and,
if addressed, how they have been answered. It is equally essential, however,
to first consider the startling data that preceded the Panetti case: Although
the Court does not state this directly, it was clear that, in the Fifth Circuit at
least (the federal circuit that includes Texas, the state in which Panetti was
convicted), the Ford test had been no test at all. 137
In other areas of the law, the Supreme Court has considered the (lack of)
value of a "paper" remedy that had never been invoked. 138 Although this
aspect of Panetti's certiorari petition was never directly addressed in the
majority's opinion, it is certainly reasonable to speculate that this sorry "track
record" might have had some impact on the majority's thinking. 139

Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 962 (2007).
See Steven K. Hoge et al., The MacArthur Adjudicative Competence Study: Development and
Validation of a Research Instrument, 21 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 141, 145-47 (1997) (discussing benefits of
such expansion); see also Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014) (expanding its opinion on its prior holding
in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), which declared capital punishment in the case of persons with
intellectual disabilities to be unconstitutional). The Court made it clear that inquiries into defendants'
intellectual disabilities for the purpose of determining whether they are potentially subject to the death
penalty cannot be limited to a bare numerical reading of an IQ score, relying on the "medical community's
opinions" on this issue, noting that that community defined intellectual disability according to three
criteria: "significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, deficits in adaptive functioning (the inability
to learn basic skills and adjust behavior to changing circumstances), and onset of these deficits during the
developmental period." Id. at 710. On the implications of Justice Alito's dissent in Hall, arguing that the
positions of professional associations relied on by the Court "at best, represent the views of a small
professional elite."), see Michael L. Perlin, "In These Times of Compassion When Conformity's in
Fashion":How TherapeuticJurisprudenceCan Root out Bias, Limit Polarizationand Support Vulnerable
Persons in the Legal Process (manuscript under submission), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=3961674 [hereinafter Perlin, In These Times].
136 See infra section IV.B.2.a.
''
Two decades have passed since this Court decided Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), and
the Fifth Circuit has yet to find a single death row inmate incompetent to be executed. See Perlin,
Merchantsand Thieves, supra note 31, at 1534. During this same period, the State of Texas has executed
360 people. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Panetti v. Quaterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007) (No. 06-6407),
2006 WL 3880284, at *26. Again, the Fifth Circuit is the heart of the "death belt." See Smith, supra note
15.
138 See Michael L. Perlin, Pretexts and Mental DisabilityLaw: The Case of Competency, 47 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 625, 634 (1993) (discussing Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 85 n.14 (1972) (noting provision of
a discovery mechanism not invoked by a single defendant in a 442-case sample)).
'34

'

13

Id.
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THE CURRENT PROJECT

In this Article, we examine how the Fifth Circuit (and, in certain
circumstances, district courts in the Fifth Circuit) have dealt with cases in
which defendants who have been sentenced to death have sought to invoke
Panetti, alleging that, under the terms of that case, they were not competent
to be executed. As noted above, the authors previously studied the Fifth
Circuit's resolutions of cases involving challenges to adequacy of counsel in
death penalty cases involving defendants with mental disabilities and in cases
involving defendants alleging that their intellectual disabilities estopped the
state from executing them. 140 We found the intellectual disability cases to be
"infinitely depressing" 141 and the adequacy of counsel cases to be "bizarre
and frightening." 142 Would this cohort of cases yield similar or contrary
results? 143
In brief, there are many fewer cases in this cohort. 144 We were only able
to find nine Fifth Circuit cases that dealt with substantive aspects of Panetti
that are relevant to our inquiry here, 145 and to this cohort, we have added four

140 See Perlin, Harmon & Chatt, supra note 15; see also Perlin, Harmon & Wetzel, supra note 15. In
addition to the raw number of death penalty cases emanating from Fifth Circuit states, the authors also
chose the Fifth Circuit because of the finding that was shared with the Supreme Court by Panetti's lawyers
in their application for a writ of certiorari that in the twenty-plus years that passed between the decision
in Ford and the Panetti case, not a single defendant in the Circuit had been found to meet the Ford test.
See Perlin, Merchants and Thieves, supra note 31, at 1534.
141 Perlin, Harmon & Wetzel, supra note 15, at 497.
142 Perlin, Harmon & Chatt, supra note 15, at 308.
143 See infra section IV.A (providing explanation of the methodology that the authors employed).
144 It may be significant to note that, in other cases, Panetti issues were raised (unsuccessfully) at the
federal district court level but then abandoned on appeal. See, e.g., Barbee v. Stephens, No. 4:09-CV-074Y, 2015 WL 4094055 (N.D. Tex. 2015); Hoffman v. Cain, No. 09-3041 SECTION "B"(1), 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 44610 (E.D. La. 2012); see also United States v. Huff, No. H-02-742, 2015 WL 5252129
(S.D. Tex. 2015) (noting unsuccessful defendant did not appeal). There has also been astonishingly little
written about Panetti in recent years in the law review literature. In the past two years, the only articles
that have discussed Panetti substantively at all are three student notes about Madison v. Alabama. See
Young, supra note 10; MacCune, supra note 10; Nicole King, From 2019 to 1984: Madison v. Alabama
and the Court's Orwellian Approach to Executions, 98 DENV. L. REV. FORUM 1 (2020). See also Marissa
Stanziani et al., Marking the Progress of a "Maturing" Society: Madison v. Alabama and Competency
for Execution Evaluations, 26 PSYCH. PUB. POL'Y & L. 145 (2020).
145 See Basso v. Stephens, 555 Fed. App'x. 335 (5th Cir. 2014); Simon v. Epps, 463 Fed. App'x. 339
(5th Cir. 2012); see also Green v. Thaler, 699 F.3d 404 (5th Cir. 2012); ShisInday v. Quarterman, 511
F.3d 514 (5th Cir. 2007); Battaglia v. Stephens, 824 F.3d 470 (5th Cir. 2016); Martinez v. Quarterman,
No. 09-70004, 2009 WL 211489 (5th Cir. 2009); Powers v. Epps, No. 2:07CV20HTW, 2009 WL 901896
(S.D. Miss. 2009); Wood v. Quarterman, 572 F. Supp. 2d 814 (W.D. Tex. 2008), vacated sub. nom. Wood
v. Thaler, 787 F. Supp. 2d 458 (W.D. Tex. 2011), aff'd, Wood v. Stephens, 619 Fed. App'x. 304 (5th Cir.
2015), cert. den., 577 U.S. 1151 (2016); Eldridge v. Thaler, No. H-05-1847, 2013 WL 416210 (S.D. Tex.
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other cases decided by district courts within the Fifth Circuit, two of which
are the only cases within the Fifth Circuit jurisdictions in which defendants
were successful in Panetti claims. 146 To the best of our knowledge, the
defendants in five cases have been executed, 147 and one defendant has died
on death row. 148 Stays of execution have been entered in two cases, 149 and
three cases have been remanded to state court for further proceedings; one,

2013); Charles v. Stephens, 612 Fed. App'x. 214 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. den., 575 U.S. 1006 (2016). In four
of these cases, in addition to the substantive issues we discuss below, the Fifth Circuit pointedly noted
that the Panetti application had not been made in a timely manner. See Charles, 612 Fed. App'x. at 222;
Battaglia, 824 F.3d at 472; Green, 699 F.3d at 422; Martinez, 2009 WL 211489, at *3. In each instance,
the authors have tried to reach out by email and/or phone calls to the most recent defense counsel (per
opinions available in Westlaw). In those instances where there were responses that illuminated the
proceedings, we have made reference to them in footnotes. Beyond the scope of this Article generally are
state court cases in the Fifth Circuit states that have considered Panetti issues. See, e.g., Staley v. State,
420 S.W.3d 785 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 2013) (defendant not competent to be executed.), discussed supra
note 95; see also Green v. State, 374 S.W.3d 434 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 2012) (state review standard lawful
after Panetti);see also King v. State, 23 So. 3d 1067 (Miss. 2009) (intervening decision in Panettidid not
overcome procedural bar doctrine); see also Druery v. State, 412 S.W.3d 523 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 2013)
(defendant made substantial showing of incompetency to be executed); see also Adams v. State, No. 0314-00180-CR, 2016 WL 110627 (Tex. Ct. App. 20016) (non-death penalty case; Panetti distinguished);
Turner v. State, 422 S.W.3d 676, 700 (Tex. Crim. Ct. App. 2013) (Keller, J., dissenting) (arguing that,
under Panetti, counsel's observations, especially with respect to delusions, are not alone a sufficient basis
for concluding that a defendant is incompetent). The authors discuss excluded federal cases infra notes
159-65 and accompanying text.
146 Powers, 2009 WL 901896, at *10-11 (Panetticlaim denied); Mays v. Director, TDCJ-CID, No.
6:19-CV-426, 2020 WL 1333212 (E.D. Tex. 2020) (same); Billiot v. Epps, No. 1:86CV549TSL, 2010
WL 1490298 (S.D. Miss. 2010) (Panetti claim granted); Aldridge v. Thaler, No. H-05-608, 2010 WL
1050335 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (same). Interestingly, there was no appeal by the state in Billiot or Aldridge.
Also, no appeal by the defendant in Mays. See infra note 151 (further development in the state courts in
the Mays case).
147 Basso , 555 Fed. App'x. 335; Green, 699 F.3d 404; Battaglia,824 F.3d 470; Martinez, 2009 WL
211489; Charles, 612 Fed. App'x. 214; see Tom Dart, Texas KillerSuzanne Basso Becomes 1 4 ' Woman
Executed in US Since 1976, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 5, 2014, 11:46 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/
[https://perma.cc/H6W4world/2014/feb/06/texas-killer-basso-woman-executed-us-death-penalty
M8DG]; see also Nancy Flake, Green executed for murderof Neal, 12, COURIER MONTGOMERY CNTY.
(Oct. 10, 2012), https://www.yourconroenews.com/neighborhood/moco/news/article/Green-executedfor-murder-of-Neal-12-9270148.php [https://perma.cc/QRA2-YFVT]; see also Jolie Mccullough, John
Battaglia executed for killing his daughters despite late appeals, TEX. TRIBUNE (Feb. 1, 2018),
https://www.texastribune.org/2018/02/01/dallas-man-who-killed-his-daughters-set-again-execution/
[https://perma.cc/ZW4C-ZCRX]; see also David Carson, Execution Report: Virgil Martinez, TEX.
EXECUTION INFO. CTR., http://www.txexecutions.org/reports/427.asp [https://perma.cc/L5ZN-6LK3]; see
also Alan Turner, Houston Killer Executed, CHRON (May 12, 2015, 6:49 PM) https://www.chron.com/
news/houston-texas/houston/article/Houston-killer-executed-6259315.php
[https://perma.cc/3QXT9DC8].
148 Shislnday, 511 F.3d 514; see Michael Graczyk, Houston Woman's Killer Dies on Death Row,
CHRON (Aug. 31, 2009), https://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Houston-woman-s-killerdies-on-death-row-1736415.php [https://perma.cc/M4LF-GZXX].
14 Wood, 787 F. Supp. 2d 458; see also Mays v. State, 476 S.W.3d 454 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 2015).
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on questions involving jury selection and adequacy of counsel, 150 and, the
other two, for further inquiries on his current competency, or lack of it. 151 In
one case, no execution date has been scheduled. 152 Astonishingly, in one of
the two not-appealed trial court victories for defendants, the defendant
remains on death row eleven years after his death sentence was vacated. 153
As discussed in depth below, these cases generally fall into four broad
categories: "the battle of the experts;" allegations of malingering; questions
of the involuntary administration of medication to make an incompetent
defendant competent to be executed; and cases where there was a lack of
strong evidence of mental illness. 154 But, as we will show, the Fifth Circuit
has basically ignored Panetti'sholdings in all its decisions.1 55
A.

The Methodology Employed

This section details the methodology that the authors employed in this
Article. An extensive search of all substantive, valid incompetency-to-beexecuted claims in the Fifth Circuit based on the Supreme Court's decision
in Panettiv. Quarterman156was conducted using the Westlaw database. First,
the key terms "Panetti v. Quarterman" offered 2,748 case opinions. We
narrowed the search to include those opinions stemming only from the Fifth
Circuit, which reduced the results down to 178. We refined the search further
to include case opinions only from the Federal Court of Appeals and Federal
District Courts, which generated 144 results.

Powers, 2009 WL 901896.
Simon v. Fisher, 641 Fed. App'x. 386 (5th Cir. 2016); Mays v. State, No. AP-77,055, 2019 WL
2361999 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 2019). In Mays, a stay of execution that had been entered in 476 S.W.3d
454 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 2015), was vacated subsequently by the same court in Mays v. State, 2019 WL
2361999 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 2019), but, in an unreported opinion, that Court entered a new stay in May
2020. See News Brief - Texas Appeals Court Stays Randall Mays' Execution on Issue of Intellectual
Disability, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (May 7, 2020) https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/stories/news-brieftexas-appeals-court-stays-randall-mays-execution-on-issue-of-intellectual-disability
[https://perma.cc/BAR3-ZSJ6].
152 Eldridge v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 2215 (2017).
' Billiot v. Epps, No. 1:86CV549TSL, 2010 WL 1490298 (S.D. Miss. 2010). According to Billiot's
appellate counsel, the trial court denied defendant's motion to be transferred to the state hospital, reasoning
in part that "[he would] get better care on [death] row." Email from Joseph Margulies, Esq., to co-author
MLP (Dec. 15, 2021) (on file with co-author MLP).
154 See infra section IV.B.2.a-d.
' See infra section IV.B.3.f.
156 Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007).
'0
'I
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Of the remaining 144 case opinions, forty of them proved to include
"valid"157 Panetti-based claims-including cases in which Panetti himself
was the defendant (seven case opinions), case opinions that included repeatdefendants (thirty case opinions), and defendants that appeared only once
(four case opinions). In total, eighteen defendants made valid Panetti-based
claims. 158 Twenty case opinions were excluded due to involving claims
related to Atkins v. Virginia;159 twenty-nine cases were excluded due to
referencing Panetti on the issue of second, successive, or successor
petitions;160 one case was excluded due to referencing Panetti on an
"opportunity to be heard" issue; 161 one case was excluded due to discussing
Panetti because of a procedural default issue; 162 four cases were excluded
due to citing Panetti to assist in explaining the trial court's reasonable or
unreasonable application of federal law; 163 four cases were excluded as they
dealt with Panetti'sinterpretation of the ripeness doctrine; 164 and forty-three
cases were excluded as they referenced Panetti for issues related to when
habeas corpus, procedurally, may be granted. 165 The final list of cases
included four district court cases, 166 and nine Fifth Circuit cases. 167
B.

The Cases

1. Introduction. - As we have already noted, there has not been a
single other case in the fourteen-plus years since the Supreme Court decided
Panetti in which the Fifth Circuit found that a defendant was incompetent to

The authors use "valid" here to indicate that the court considered the Panetti claim on the merits.
It does not mean that the court found the claim substantively valid.
158 Infra Table 1.
'
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); see Perlin, Harmon & Wetzel, supra note 15; infra Table
2.
16 Infra Table 3.
161 Infra Table 4.
162 Infra Table 5.
"'

Infra Table 6.
16 Infra Table 7.
163

165 These cases involved interpretations of the Anti-Terrorism & Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA). Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (1996); infra
Table 8.
166 See Powers v. Epps, No. 2:07CV20HTW, 2009 WL 901896 (S.D. Miss. 2009); Billiot v. Epps, No.
1:86CV549TSL, 2010 WL 1490298 (S.D. Miss. 2010); Mays v. State, No. AP-77,055, 2019 WL 2361999
(Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 2019); Aldridge v. Thaler, No. H-05-6082010, 2010 WL 1050335 (S.D. Tex. 2010).
167 See Basso v. Stephens, 555 Fed. App'x. 335 (5th Cir. 2014); Simon v. Fisher, 641 Fed. App'x. 386
(5th Cir. 2016); Wood v. Thaler, 787 F. Supp. 2d 458 (W.D. Tex. 2011); Green v. Thaler, 699 F.3d 404,
407 (5th Cir. 2012); Eldridge v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 2215 (2017); Charles v. Stephens, 612 Fed. App'x. 214
(5th Cir. 2015); ShisInday v. Quarterman, 511 F.3d 514 (5th Cir. 2007); Battaglia v. Stephens, 824 F.3d
470 (5th Cir. 2016); Martinez v. Quarterman, No. 09-70004, 2009 WL 211489 (5th Cir. 2009).

580

UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:555

be executed, and only two such cases were decided by a district court within
the Circuit. 168 Of those cases in which Panetticlaims have been assessed (and
ultimately rejected) on the merits, 169 all fall into one of the categories
described below. 170
2. Grounds for decisions. - Eight of the cases in which Panetti
applications were rejected turned, at least in part, on questions related to
expert testimony, a cohort that included five cases in which the trial court had
evaluated believability,17 1 and three that related to expert funding. 172 Three
turned, again, in part, on questions of malingering17 3 (in two of which the
court had found that the defense expert conceded that he believed the
defendant was malingering),17 4 three on synthetic competency, "5 and two on
the purported lack of evidence of major mental illness. 176 This Article now
considers the implications of each of these cases.
(a) The Controlling Issues Relating to Witness Testimony. -

The first

issue relating to witness testimony is which expert was seen as more
believable. Several cases illustrated the issue of "credibility" of the experts;
in Eldridge,Basso, Green, and Wood, the state expert was found to be more

168 See Billiot, 2010 WL 1490298; Aldridge, 2010 WL 1050335. Only in a subsequent opinion in the
Panetti litigation did the Fifth Circuit reverse a district court order that had denied Panetti's motion for
counsel and expert assistance as part of the process of determining his current competence to be executed.
Panetti v. Stephens, 863 F.3d 366 (5th Cir. 2017).
169 This excludes cases that cite Panetti on questions related to (1) the viability of successor petitions
(see, e.g., Storey v. Lumpkin, 8 F.4th 382 (5th Cir. 2021); In re Cathey, 857 F.3d 221 (5th Cir. 2017); In
re Sepulvado, 707 F.3d 550 (5th Cir. 2013)); (2) when habeas corpus, procedurally, may be granted,
interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), the Anti-Terroism & Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) (see,
e.g., Ramey v. Lumpkin, 7 F.4th 271 (5th Cir 2021); Smith v. Cain, 708 F.3d 628 (5th Cir. 2013)), and
(3) ripeness of litigation (see, e.g., In re Halprin, 88 Fed. App'x. 941 (5th Cir. 2019) ; In re Sepulvado,
707 F.3d 550 (5th Cir. 2013); Ramos v. Quarterman, No. M-07-059, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126575 (S.D.
Tex. 2008); United States v. Bernard, 820 Fed. App'x. 309 (5th Cir. 2020)).
"0 Some of these cases (see, e.g., Eldridge, 137 S. Ct. 2215; Basso, 555 Fed. App'x. 335; Simon, 641
Fed. App'x. 386) fall into multiple categories. In Wood, malingering was discussed in a district court
opinion. See Wood, 787 F. Supp. 2d at 480-84 (but not in the Fifth Circuit opinion). See infra section
IV.B.2.f (providing a summary of findings on all categories of cases).
'' Eldridge v. Thaler, No. H-05-1847, 2013 WL 416210 (S.D. Tex. 2013); Basso, 555 Fed. App'x.
335; Simon v. Epps, 463 Fed. App'x. 339 (5th Cir. 2012); Wood v. Quarterman, 572 F. Supp. 2d 814
(W.D. Tex. 2008), vacated sub. nom. Wood v. Thaler, 787 F. Supp. 2d 458 (W.D. Tex. 2011), aff'd, Wood
v. Stephens, 619 Fed. App'x. 304 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. den., 577 U.S. 1151 (2016); Martinez, 2009 WL
211489.
172 Battaglia, 824 F.3d 470; Powers v. Epps, No. 2:07CV20HTW, 2009 WL 901896 (S.D. Miss. 2009);
Charles, 612 Fed. App'x. 214, cert. den., 575 U.S. 1006 (2016).
173 Basso, 555 Fed. App'x. 335; Simon, 463 Fed. App'x. 339; Eldridge, 2013 WL 416210.
'74 Simon, 463 Fed. App'x. 339; Eldridge, 2013 WL 416210.
175 Basso, 555 Fed. App'x. 335; ShisInday v. Quarterman, 511 F.3d 514 (5th Cir. 2007); see also
Staley v. State, 420 S.W.3d 785 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 2013).
176 Wood, 787 F. Supp. 2d 458, aff'd, Wood, 619 Fed. App'x. 304, cert. den., 577 U.S. 1151 (2016);
Simon, 463 Fed. App'x. 339.
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credible than the defense expert,1 7 7 and that finding contributed significantly
(in some cases, perhaps, dispositively), to the court's final decision.

178

In Wood, the defendant had been convicted in Texas in 1998 of capital
murder. 179 Although the Fifth Circuit did not expressly state that the
defendant was malingering, it upheld the district court finding that the
defendant's Panetti claim and his conspiracy theory were "little more than a
ruse to avoid his own execution." 1 80 Much of this decision appeared to turn
on the Peters Delusional Inventory [hereinafter "PDI"] that was used by the
defense expert, Dr. Roman, to diagnose Wood with a delusional disorder. 181
A state's expert, Dr. Mary Conroy, had claimed that the PDI was not an
accurate test for this diagnosis under the definition of the DSM-IV-TR, 18 2
leading the district court to conclude (a conclusion affirmed by the Fifth
Circuit) that, "In light of Dr. Roman's subsequent admission as to the limited
utility of the Peters Delusions Inventory, [we] question the efficacy of Dr.
Roman's delusional diagnosis."183
What is most puzzling in this case is the apparent total absence of
empirical evidence as to the validity and reliability of the PDI. 184 By way of
examples, studies published before the court hearings in question concluded
that validity of the test was confirmed, that there was consistency of scores
when the test was repeated on subjects, and that psychotic inpatients had
significantly higher scores, thus establishing the test's "criterion validity." 85

177 The state expert that was ruled more credible in three of the cases was Dr. Mark Moeller.
Additionally, Dr. Michael Roman was used as the defense expert in two of the cases where he was found
not to be credible.
178 Eldridge, 2013 WL 416210; Basso, 555 Fed. App'x. 335; Green v. Thaler, 699
F.3d 404, 407 (5th
Cir. 2012); Wood v. Quarterman, 572 F. Supp. 2d 814 (W.D. Tex. 2008), vacated sub. nom. Wood, 787
F. Supp. 2d 458, aff'd, Wood v. Stephens, 619 Fed. App'x. 304 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. den., 577 U.S. 1151
(2016).
179 Wood, 619 Fed. App'x. at 305; Wood v. Stephens, 540 Fed. App'x. 422,424 (5th Cir. 2013) (noting,
in prior proceedings, the Fifth Circuit had granted a certificate of appealability based on the fact that
"jurists of reason could debate whether the district court's improper reliance upon its past experience with
death row inmates resulted in an unfair hearing in violation of Wood's Fourteenth Amendment due process
rights." Id.).
180 Wood, 619 Fed. App'x. at 306.
181

Id. at307.

182 Id. (noting, stupefyingly, Dr. Roman actually conceded later that this test was not "a proper test for
determining a delusional disorder."); see also id. at 308 (providing the district court had ruled that, "In
light of Dr. Roman's subsequent admission as to the limited utility of the Peters Delusions Inventory, [we]
question the efficacy of Dr. Roman's delusional diagnosis.").
183 Id. at 308.
184 See generally Emmanuelle R. Peters et al., MeasuringDelusionalIdeation: The 21-Item Peters et
al. Delusions Inventory (PDI), 30 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 1005 (2004); Wood v. Thaler, 787 F. Supp. 2d
458. 482 (W.D. Tex. 2011) (suggesting that Dr. Roman administered the twenty-one-item version of the
PDI).
185 Peters, supra note 184, at 1011.
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Another research study concluded that "the expected high negative predictive
value of the PDI (96%) in the general population suggests it will be a valuable
tool in future research on psychosis proneness." 86 And a 2012 study
concluded that the PDI is a "reliable and valid instrument for measuring the
dimensionality of delusion proneness."1 87 None of this scientifically (and
easily accessible)188 reliable data was apparently presented to any of the
courts, or, if it was, none was mentioned in any of the multiple court opinions
in this case. 18 9
In Green v. Thaler, the defendant had been convicted and sentenced to
death for capital murder in 2002.190 The district court had initially granted
the defendant's motion for a stay of execution, 191 but the Fifth Circuit
reversed that stay.'192
Here, in testimony on the question of the defendant's competency to be
executed, the state's expert (again Dr. Mark Moeller) "concluded that despite
likely having intermittent hallucinations and disorganized behaviors, it is
unlikely [he] is suffering from schizophrenia." 193 The court concluded that,
although Green presented evidence that he suffered from schizophrenia, he
did not demonstrate that he "lacked the rational understanding that he was to
be executed for Neal's death."1 94 Significantly the court also ruled that "the
most compelling evidence [of competency] was from your own expert." 95
At the district court level, the State had produced documents "revealing
inter alia that mental health professionals with the Texas Department of
Criminal Justice ... had concluded after observation in an inpatient clinical
setting and psychological tests that Green suffered from delusions and
hallucinations [, and that he had] been diagnosed as suffering from

186 Antonio Preti et al., The Psychometric Discriminative Properties of the Peters et al. Delusions
Inventory: A Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve Analysis, 48 COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHIATRY 62
(2007).
187 Yu-Chen Kao, The Psychometric Properties of the Peters et al. Delusions Inventory (PDI) in
Taiwan: Reliability, Validity, and Utility, 47 SoC. PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHIATRIC EPIDEMIOL. 1221 (2012).
188 All of the citations in notes 184-87 were accessed by simple searches in Google Scholar.
189 It must be noted that more sophisticated instruments have since been developed, ones that now may
render the PDI "problematic" in its ability to diagnose delusional disorder. Email from Mark Cunningham,
Ph.D., to co-author MLP (Dec. 17, 2021) (on file with co-author MLP). See, e.g., Mark D. Cunningham,
Differentiating Delusional Disorder from the Radicalization of Extreme Beliefs: A 17-Factor Model, 3 J.
THREAT ASSESSMENT & MGMT. 137 (2018), (proposing a Model of Analysis for Differentiating
Delusional Disorder from the Radicalization of Extreme Beliefs-17 Factor (MADDD-or-Rad-17)).
'0
Green v. Thaler, 699 F.3d 404, 407 (5th Cir. 2012).
'1
Green v. Thaler, No. CIV.A. H-07-827, 2012 wL 4765809 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 8, 2012), vacated and
remanded, 699 F.3d 404 (5th Cir. 2012), as revised (Oct. 31, 2012).
192 Green, 699 F.3d at 420-21.
1 Id. at 415.
19 Id.

Id. at 418

.
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schizophrenia, undifferentiated type." 1 96 On appeal, the Circuit court simply
said that the defendant had received "the process he was due," 1 97 and paid no
attention to the factual findings as to his diagnosis, and the severity of his
mental illness that had been considered by the district court. 198
Moreover, when the full paragraph of the trial court's finding as to the
defendant's expert is read, 199 it is clear that the standards of Panetti were not
met. The state court came to its conclusion because the testimony showed
that the defendant "[knew he was] to be executed by the State, [knew he was]
convicted of killing the victim . .. [knows] the execution date, and then ...
proclaimed [his] innocence which shows a rational understanding of [the]
imminent date and . . . the charges . . . against [him]." 200 Nothing here,
however, goes to a critical prong of Panetti: did the defendant have a
"rational understanding of the State's reason for his execution"? 201 Although
the issue of "rational understanding" was addressed, it appeared only to be
considered in the context of the fact that the defendant was able to proclaim
his innocence, 202 a far cry from what is demanded by Panetti.203
The second issue relating to witness testimony is denial of expert
funding. In Battaglia v. Davis, the defendant sought funding for a mitigation
specialist who could have obtained additional non-expert information to
show that the defendant was not malingering.204 This application was rejected
because, given the limitations of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), it came "too late to
produce evidence that may be presented to the state court in making the
adjudication in question." 205 Interestingly, here the defendant conceded that
some of this work could have been done by counsel, but that the proposed
mitigation investigator "has the experience and training to conduct interviews
involving sensitive mental health and background issues that counsel
lacks." 206

196
'"

Green, 2012 WL 4765809, at *2 (noting "[t]esting indicated that he was not malingering.").
Green, 699 F.3d at 413.

198 Id.
"9 Id. at 418 (quoting Green v. State, 374 S.W.3d 434, 437-38 (Tex. Cr. Crim. App. 2012).
200 Id.
201 Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 956 (2007).
202 Green, 699 F.3d
at 418.
Panetti, 551 U.S. at 956.
Battaglia v. Davis, No. 3:16-CV-1687-B, 2018 WL 550518, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 24, 2018) (stay
of execution denied); 138 S. Ct. 943 (2018). For earlier opinions in the Battaglia case, see Battaglia v.
Stephens, 621 Fed. App'x. 781 (5th Cir. 2015) (affirming district court decision (2013 WL 5570216 (N.D.
Tex. 2013)) that had denied his habeas corpus petition based on alleged ineffectiveness of counsel in
defendant's capital murder case).
20s Id., at *6.
203

204

206

Id
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There is no longer any question that capital mitigation specialists are
critical members of the capital defense team. 207 The American Bar
Association's Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases makes it crystal-clear: "the use of mitigation
specialists has become 'part of the existing standard of care' in capital cases,
ensuring 'high quality investigation and preparation of the penalty phase."' 208
These Guidelines underscore that "[m]itigation specialists possess clinical
and information-gathering skills and training that most lawyers simply do not
have." 209 There is no mention whatsoever of these Guidelines in any
Battagliaopinion. 210
In Powers v. Epps,211 a case in which the defendant had suffered two
strokes following his capital murder conviction,212 the court rejected
defendant's request that funds be made available for an expert witness to
determine whether he had become incompetent to be executed under
2 13
Panetti.
Here, inexplicably, the court concluded, "[i]t is questionable
whether these affidavits [submitted on behalf of the defendant] raise a
substantial question as to whether the memory loss caused by Powers's
strokes 'prevents him from comprehending the reasons for the [death] penalty
or its implications.'"1
There is no evidence that any testimony was ever taken on the impact of
stroke-caused memory loss on one's ability to comprehend a future
punishment.215 Certainly, it is an issue whose resolution would have
benefitted from competent expert opinion. 216

Emily Hughes, Mitigating Death, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 337, 379 (2009).
AM. BAR ASS'N., GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL
IN DEATH PENALTY CASES § 4.1 cmt. (rev. ed. 2003), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
administrative/death penalty representation/2003guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/AMK4-JEBT].
209 Id.
207
208

210 See Perlin, Harmon & Chatt, supra note 15, at 269 ("A review of eighty death sentences issued in
four 'death belt states' (Georgia, Mississippi, Alabama, and Virginia) between 1997 and 2004 found that
'[i]n 73 of the 80 cases, defense lawyers gave jurors little or no evidence to help them decide whether the
accused should live or die."' Id. at 268 (citing Sanjay K. Chhablani, Chronically Stricken: A Continuing
Legacy of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 28 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REv. 352, 363 (2009))).
211 Powers v. Epps, No. 2:07CV20HTW, 2009 WL 901896 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 31, 2009).
212 Id., at *3.
213

Id.

214

Id. (citing Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 418 (1986)).

215 See, e.g., Noor Kamal Al-Qazzaz et al., Cognitive Impairment and Memory Dysfunction After
a

Stroke Diagnosis: A Post-Stroke Memory Assessment, 10 NEUROPSYCHIATRIC DISEASE & TREATMENT
1677 (2014) (providing more on the extent of the impact of a stroke on brain functioning).
216 Subsequently, the case was remanded to state court for further consideration of an adequacy of
counsel issue. Powers, 2009 WL 901896.
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The third issue relating to witness testimony is concessions by defense
experts in which they essentially testified in agreement with state experts. 217
(b) Whether the Defendant Was Malingering. - Multiple cases reflect
the rejection of Panetti claims based on a state expert evaluation that the
defendant was malingering his or her mental illness in order to be ruled
incompetent to be executed. 218 Interestingly, and remarkably, in two of these
cases, the potential for malingering was at least partially conceded by the
defense expert. 2 19
Basso's Panetti claim was rejected in part based on what was
characterized as her "history of malingering and engaging in attentionseeking behavior including 'falsifying psychiatric and physical
symptoms."'220 The Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court's conclusion
that the state court's findings regarding malingering 221 were "well supported
by the record." 222

This was by no means a cut-and-dry case. One of the main pieces of
evidence relied on by the courts that came to this conclusion was a claim the
defendant made that she was a fourteen-year-old girl named Suzanne Burns
who lived at the St. Anne's Institute in Albany, New York, "where she was
sent because her mother was mean to her."22 3 Yet, in state habeas
proceedings, the defendant had produced documents that included evidence
that "Basso was raised in poverty; her natural father was an abusive alcoholic
who abandoned his family; she was sexually molested by her step-father,
step-brother, and uncle; she was physically abused by her mother and stepfather." 22 4 Apparently, largely because trial counsel decided against
presenting evidence of sexual abuse Basso suffered as a child because of the
similarity of it to the abuse Basso and her co-defendants had inflicted on the

217 See infra notes 235-40 and accompanying text (discussing this issue in the context of
allegations
of malingering in the Eldridge case) and infra notes 228-34 and accompanying text (discussing this issue
in the context of allegations of malingering in the Simon case).
218 See Simon v. Epps, 463 Fed. App'x. 339 (5th Cir. 2012); Eldridge v. Thaler, No. H-05-1847, 2013
WL 416210 (S.D. Tex. 2013).
219 Simon, 463 Fed. App'x 339; Eldridge, 2013 WL 416210.
220 Basso v. Stephens, 555 Fed. App'x. 335, 341 (5th Cir.
2014).
221 See Basso v. State, No. 73672, 2003 WL 1702283 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. Jan 15. 2003).
222 Basso, 555 Fed. Appx. at 348.
223 Basso v. Quarterman, No. H-07-3047, 2009 WL 9083708, at *9 (S.D.
Tex. 2009).
224 Basso v. Thaler, 359 Fed. App'x. 504, 508 (5th
Cir. 2010).
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victim in the case before the court,225 this evidence was not presented. 226
When considered in context, this evidence might have had a significant
impact on the malingering finding, but it does not appear that it was ever
turned over to the examining state's witnesses.227
Malingering was also considered in Simon v. Epps,228 a case in which the
defendant had been convicted of capital murder of three of his family
members. 229 There, the Fifth Circuit accepted the testimony of the stateretained expert, Dr. Gilbert S. Macvaugh III, who had found that Simon "was
malingering his memory loss," and that the defendant had made "naive
attempts to malinger memory deficits and his rather severe antisocial
personality traits." 23 0 Pointedly, defendant's own expert "could not rule out
the potential that Simon was malingering." 231
What is not mentioned anywhere in the Fifth Circuit opinion is the initial
report of defense expert Dr. Goff, and that lack of mention is more than
curious. In this report (based on a review of records as, at this point in time,
defense counsel's request for an outside expert to evaluate Simon had been
denied), Dr. Goff had said this:
The course of events here suggests that the neuropsychological defect
demonstrated by Mr. Simon may indeed be interfering substantially with
his ability to communicate with his attorneys and that it may well constitute
a mental illness or defect that is preventing him from comprehending the
reasons for the penalty imposed upon him or its implications. The
descriptions of him suggest that he may have little or no understanding of
the concepts shared by his attorneys and the community as a whole. I am
not even certain that he has a factual understanding of his current
situation.2 32

221 Id. at 508. It is not unusual for individuals to inflict on victims the same abuse they had
suffered at
the hands of their families of origin. See, e.g., Lynch, Perlin & Cucolo, supra note 8, at 222-23 (discussing
United States v. Montgomery, 635 F.3d 1074, 1081-82 (8th Cir. 2011); Montgomery v. Barr, No. 4:20CV-01281-P, 2020 WL 7353711, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 15, 2020)). See generally Amy T. Campbell,
Addressing the Community Trauma of Inequity Holistically: The Head and the HeartBehind Structural
Interventions, 98 DENy. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (2021) (discussing the long-lasting impact of childhood trauma).
226 Basso, 2009 WL 9083708,
at *13.
227

Id.

228

Simon v. Fisher, 641 Fed. App'x. 386 (5th Cir. 2016).

229 Id. at 387.
230

Id. at 388.

231 Id. at 387. The district court had found that defendant

whom it found to have no history of mental
was competent to be executed, a conclusion with which the Fifth Circuit agreed. Id. at 388.
232 Simon v. Epps, 463 Fed. App'x. 339, 342 (5th Cir. 2012).

illness
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Subsequently, some months after the Fifth Circuit opinion, Dr. Goff did
do an in-person evaluation of Simon, and found that Simon did not appear to
understand the purpose of his visit and "expressed a lack of recall or
understanding of his situation in terms of his current incarceration and the
penalty which had been imposed upon him." 233 He also found that Simon was
exhibiting "global amnesia." 234
The Eldridge case is a complicated one, and it may be that the evidence
of malingering did outweigh the evidence of such serious mental illness as to
23 5
prevent execution under Panetti.
However, as discussed below, the Fifth
Circuit gave no heed to testimony that had been offered indicating the
severity of that mental illness, notwithstanding the initial district court
opinion in the case bringing focus to what at least two expert witnesses saw
as severe mental illness and lack of malingering. 236
Although the Fifth Circuit ultimately concluded that Dr. Nathan was
credible, it found that his testimony was of "limited probative value" because
most of his contact was "via video conference"2 37 and he did not specifically

233

Simon v. McCarty, No. 2:11-CV-111-SA, 2014 WL 7338860, *13 (N.D. Miss. 2014).

234 Simon v. Fisher, 641 Fed. App'x. 386, 387 (5th Cir. 2016). This predated the Supreme Court's

decision in Dunn v. Madison, 138 S. Ct. 9 (2018), on the impact of a death row prisoner's cognitive
impairment on executability. See Young, supra note 10; see also MacCune, supra note 10.
235 In earlier proceedings, Eldridge had been convicted and sentenced to death in 1994 for
the murder
of his former girlfriend and her daughter. He originally had "made a substantial showing of incompetency
based on demonstrated bizarre behavior and delusional statements, corroborated by expert evidence, and
[therefore] was entitled to a hearing on his claim." Eldridge v. Stephens, 599 Fed App'x. 123, 126 (5th
Cir. 2015).
236 See Eldridge v. Thaler, H-05-1847, 2013 WL 416210 (S.D. Tex. 2013). In the initial Eldridge
opinion, the court pointed out that "Eldridge expressed delusional beliefs that prison guards were
poisoning his food[,]" that Eldridge was not malingering, and that Dr. Roman testified that Eldridge
suffered from a "psychotic disorder." Id. at *11-12, *15, *17. Among the indicia of this disorder were
these findings:
"
Eldridge told Dr. Roman that his girlfriend was alive, that he had seen her recently, and that
he knew he had been accused of killing her, but that it made no sense to him (the girlfriend
was the victim in the case). Id. at *18.
"
Eldridge also told Roman that his food was being poisoned, and that he has traveled outside
the prison on a regular basis. Id.
"
Dr. Roman also noted that Eldridge heard voices in his head and experienced hallucinations.
Id. at *19.
See also Battaglia v. State, 537 S.W.3d 57, 74 (Tex. Crim. Ct. App. 2017) (discussing these fact-findings).
237 See Loandra Torres et al., ForensicAssessment in the Time of Covid-19: The ColoradoExperience
in Developing Videoconferencingfor EvaluatingAdjudicative Competency, 27 PSYCH. PUB. POLY & L.
522 (2021) (providing a post-COVID analysis of the use of videoconferencing in such contexts in an
article that cites the Eldridge case.) This article, written years after the case in question, concluded:
In sum, the available guidelines suggest forensic evaluators using VC
[videoconferencing] platforms must practice due diligence with regard to privacy
of information; seek opportunities to develop their skills and knowledge related to
VC technology and implementation; consider need, security, and validity when
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test the defendant for malingering. 238 The court ultimately ruled that the
"district court did not clearly err by finding [the defendant] competent to be
executed because it relied on overwhelming evidence indicating [he was]
malingering." 239
In this case, a state expert, Dr. Mark S. Moeller, a board-certified
psychiatrist, had evaluated the defendant and concluded "Eldridge was
malingering" and "feigning mental illness to avoid execution."240 Moreover,
the court found that Dr. Moeller had "presented compelling evidence that the
defendant is malingering, noting the atypical presentation of the defendant's
symptoms." 241 Further, Dr. Moeller (and Dr. Allen, the other state expert),
discredited the "double-bookkeeping" theory of schizophrenia on which Dr.
Roman had relied, 242 concluding, instead, that the "inconsistencies in
delusions and behaviors" were to be expected and "not an indication of
[defendant's] malingering." 243 Dr. Moeller testified after a review of the
"literature on double- bookkeeping" and concluded "the theory just doesn't
hold water." 244 The court thus ruled that the district court "did not clearly err
by finding [the defendant] competent to be executed because it relied on
overwhelming evidence indicating Eldridge is malingering."245

using psychological testing; ensure groups with fewer resources are not treated
unfairly in the VC process; and be open with all parties regarding the benefits and
limitations of VC evaluations in general.
Id. at 524.
238 Eldridge v. Davis, 661 Fed. App'x. 253, 256 (5th
Cir. 2016).
239 Id. at 253.

24 Id. at 255.
2' Id. at 256.
242

Id.

23 Id. at 266.
24 Id. at 260.
25 Id. It is not clear from the opinions whether there was any testimony as to what articles Dr. Moeller
reviewed when he testified as to the "literature." The "double-bookkeeping" theory created by Dr. Eugen
Blueler, see DEMENTIA PRAECOX OR THE GROUP OF SCHIZOPHRENIAS (J. Zinkin trans.) (1950), has been
considered positively in important contemporary research, see, e.g., Louis A. Sass, Delusion and Double
Book-Keeping, KARL JASPERS' PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 125 (Thomas Fuchs, Thiemo

Breyer & Christoph Mundt eds. 2014); Mads G. Henriksen & Josef Parnas, Self-disorders and
Schizophrenia: A Phenomenological Reappraisal of Poor Insight and Noncompliance, 40
SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 542 (2014) ("[what] Bleuler termed 'double bookkeeping,' is, in our view, central
to understanding what poor insight in schizophrenia really is." Id. at 542.), and this research continues to
this day. See, e.g., Jo Ellen Wilson et al., Pseudodelirium: Psychiatric Conditions to Consider on the
Differentialfor Delirium, 33 J. NEUROPSYCHIATRY & CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE 356 (2021) ("Clinicians
should also be aware of the possibility of apparent disorientation due to 'double bookkeeping' in some
psychotic conditions[] . . .), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8929410/pdf/nihms1706575.pdf [https://perma.cc/QDJ2-2W6W]; Jos6 Eduardo Porcher, Double Bookkeeping and
Doxasticism aboutDelusion, 26 PHIL., PSYCHIATRY & PSYCH. 111, 118 (2019) (". . . delusions are highly
heterogeneous phenomena and, thus, it should come as no surprise that some delusions are more belieflike, while others depart from stereotypical beliefs."); Michel Cermolacce et al., Multiple Realities and
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Dr. Allen noted "several oddities in the historical presentation of
Eldridge's symptoms." 246 He testified that the "combination of auditory,
tactile, and visual hallucinations" were inconsistent with "genuine mental
illness." 247 Moreover, the results on the "TOMM, SIMS, and M-FAST" tests

suggested a "high probability that Eldridge was feigning his symptoms. "248
Remarkably, in spite of his conclusion that the defendant was not
malingering, 249 it appears that elsewhere in his testimony, Dr. Roman had
conceded that there was evidence of malingering in the defendant's
psychiatric history. 25 0 Several red flags of malingering that were admitted by
Dr. Roman include the following:
1) an absence of major mental health complaints prior to the
scheduling of defendant's execution date in 2009;

Hybrid Objects: A Creative Approach of Schizophrenic Delusion, 9 FRONTIERS PSYCH. (2018),
https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00107/full [https://perma.cc/2QZ9-ZNR5]. It is
not clear at all whether testimony as to the Sass reference and the Henrickson/Parnas reference which
were available at the time of the Eldridge opinions was ever presented to the Court.
246 Eldridge, 661 Fed. App'x. at 261.
247 Id.
248 Id. Dr. Roman had dismissed the M-FAST test (the Miller Forensic Assessment of Symptoms Test)
as "unreliable because it lacks the precision necessary to distinguish between genuine and feigned
response patterns." Eldridge v. Thaler, No. H-05-1847, 2013 WL 416210, *8 (S.D. Tex. 2013). Further,
he criticized the use of the TOMM (Test of Memory Malingering) as irrelevant because "memory is not
at issue," and similarly found Dr. Allen's administration of the SIMS (Structured Interview of Mental
Symptoms) test to be unreliable "because it is written at a level beyond Eldridge's reading ability." Id.
Valid and reliable research characterizes the M-FAST as "moderately a useful assessment in classifying
individuals as either honest responders or malingerers." Khodabakhsh Ahmadi et al., Malingering and
PTSD: Detecting Malingering and War Related PTSD by Miller Forensic Assessment of Symptoms Test
(M-FAST), 13 BMC PSYCHIATRY 1 (2013). A study of twenty-one research reports on the use of this
instrument concluded that an examinee should not be classified as malingering from the results of the MFAST total score alone. David Detullio et al., A Meta-Analysis of the Miller Forensic Assessment of
Symptoms Test (M-FAST), 31 PSYCH. ASSESSMENT 1319 (2019). A meta-analysis of the SIMS test
concluded that it may overestimate feigning in patients who suffer from schizophrenia. Alfons van
Impelen et al., The Structured Inventory of MalingeredSymptomatology (SIMS): A Systematic Review and
Meta-analysis, 28 CLINICAL NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 1336 (2014). There are, of course, many other tests to
discern malingering in addition to the three used by Dr. Allan. See, e.g., John E. Meyers & Marie E.
Volbrecht, A Validation Of Multiple Malingering Detection Methods In a Large Clinical Sample, 18
ARCH. CLIN. NEUROPSYCHOL. 261 (2003); Tina Hanlon Inmana & David T.R. Berry, Cross-Validationof
Indicatorsof Malingering: A Comparison of Nine Neuropsychological Tests, Four Tests of Malingering,
and Behavioral Observations, 17 ARCHIVES CLINICAL NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 1 (2002). It does not appear
any of these were ever mentioned in the Eldridge litigation.
249 See Eldridge, 2013 WL 416210, at *17 (S.D. Tex. 2013). "[Roman] concluded that Eldridge is not
malingering."
250 See Eldridge, 661 Fed. Appx. at 261.
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2) many statements and behavior of defendant's during his exam
with Mr. Moeller that were "more consistent with malingering
than schizophrenia"; and
3) the defendant's ability to obtain "cocaine in prison" was
inconsistent with "somebody with a severe psychotic
disorder." 25 1

In sum, the state experts both believed the defendant was malingering,
and both defense experts believed the defendant was incompetent to be
executed.252
(c) Cases Involving Questions of "Synthetic Competency. "253 - Two
cases of this cohort illustrate the controversial concept of "synthetic
competency": 254 Basso (discussed earlier for expert clash and malingering
255
issues) and ShisInday v. Quarterman.
In the Basso case, the defendant highlighted a statement of Dr. Quijano's
(her expert witness) that she would "not necessarily remain competent if
taken off her medication," a conclusion disagreed with by the state's expert,
again, Dr. Moeller. 256 In earlier proceedings, the district court had noted that
Dr. Quijano was a clinical psychologist, not a medical doctor. In contrast, Dr.
Moeller, a medical doctor, disagreed with Dr. Quijano's conclusion.257 Dr.
Moeller explained that Basso's medications were "prescribed for mood
disorders, not a delusional disorder." 25 8 The district court found Dr. Moeller's
opinion "more convincing[,]" and that finding was upheld by Fifth Circuit. 25 9
Markedly, there was no discussion in any of the six Basso opinions of
any of the most important cases that deal with questions of synthetic
competency, all discussed extensively earlier: 260 Perry v. Louisiana,261
Singleton v. Norris,262 or Singleton v. State.263

251
252

Id.

253

See generally section IIA.

Id.

254 See, e.g., Lyn Suzanne Entzeroth, The Illusion of Sanity: The Constitutionaland Moral Danger
of

Medicating Condemned Prisonersin Order to Execute Them, 76 TENN. L. REV. 641 (2009).
255 Shislnday v. Quarterman, 511 F.3d 514 (5th Cir. 2007).
256 Basso v. Stephens, 555 Fed. App'x. 335, 343 (5th
Cir. 2014).
257 Basso v. Stephens, No. H-14-213, 2014 WL 412549, at *15-16 (S.D. Tex. 2014).
258 Id. at*16.
259 Id.
260 See supra notes 95-127 and accompanying text.
261 Perry v. Louisianna, 498 U.S. 38 (1990), reh'g denied, 498 U.S. 1075 (1991); State v. Perry, 502
So. 2d 543, 546 (La. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 872, reh'g denied, 484 U.S. 992 (1987).
262 Singleton v. Norris, 992 S.W.2d 768 (Ark. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1084
(2000).
263 Singleton v. State, 437 S.E.2d 53, 60-62 (S.C. 1993).
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In the ShisInday case, the defendant had been convicted of capital murder
in Texas and sentenced to death in 1982.264 Although the Circuit conceded
that he had a "long history of mental problems" and "mental illness," 265 it
simply relied on its decision in In re Neville 266-a two paragraph per curiam
pre-Panettidecision that had rejected the defendant's arguments that Atkins
ought be extended to defendants with mental illness 267-to similarly reject
ShisInday's arguments, as he "does not claim that he is insane. "268
Synthetic competency issues were also raised in several of the state and
district court cases to which we have previously referred. 269 In Billiot v.
Epps,270 the defendant had argued that he could not be "restored to
competency through forcible medication" and could not be executed "if his
competence is synthetic or induced by medication."271 The district court,
which had entered an indefinite stay of execution, based on its "fundamental
belief that Billiot is incompetent to be executed," 272 held that, if the State
were to move to vacate the stay (on the theory that the defendant had regained
his competence), the court would then consider any claim by Billiot regarding
the "method by which Billiot's competence was restored." 273 In Staley v.
Dretke,274 a pre-Panettidecision, the federal court had ruled to vacate the
defendant's stay of execution on the grounds that the defendant "failed to
make a substantial showing that he was incompetent." 275 Ultimately,
however, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals ordered a stay, finding that
the trial court was unauthorized to forcibly medicate an incompetent death
row inmate to achieve competency for execution. 276
Finally, in the case of Larry Hatten, some five years after the Fifth Circuit
rejected his final death penalty sentence appeal, 277 a case in which the
defendant was forcibly administered anti-psychotic medication during his

264

ShisInday v. Quarterman, 511 F.3d 514, 515 (5th Cir. 2007).

265 Id. at 514, 519, 521. In earlier proceedings, a writ of habeas corpus had been granted to the

defendant because, among other reasons, he had been involuntarily medicated at trial"without [the Court]
making a proper inquiry into his mental state." Id. at 519.
266 In re Neville, 440 F.3d 220, 221 n.1
(5th Cir. 2006).
267 Id. at221.
268 ShisInday, 511 F.3d at
521.
269 See, e.g., Basso v. Stephens, No. H-14-213, 2014 WL
412549 (S.D. Tex. 2014).
Billiot v. Epps, No. 86CV659TSL, 2010 WL 1490298 (S.D. Miss. 2010).
Id. at *3.
272 Id. at *5.
270
271

273

Id.

Staley v. Dretke, 126 Fed. App'x. 667 (5th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 669.
276 Staley v. State, 420 S.W.3d 785 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 2013).
277 See Hatten v. Quarterman, 570 F.3d 595 (5th Cir. 2009).
274
275
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trial, 278 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, in an unreported case, stayed
his execution, noting that he had been forcibly medicated while
incarcerated. 279
The Supreme Court had carefully considered the impact of involuntarily
medicating a mentally ill defendant while on trial in 1992 in Riggins v.
Nevada.280 In ShisInday, however, the Fifth Circuit merely concluded that
the admission of testimony when ShisInday was in a medicated state "did not
have a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict;" 281 in Basso, it found
that the medication was consensual, thus distinguishing Riggins, 282
notwithstanding defendant's argument that the state had "deceived counsel
by not informing them about the medication[.]" 28 3 In short, the Riggins issues
were given less than short shrift by the Circuit in these cases. 284
(d) Cases Where the Court Found There Was Not Strong Enough
Evidence of Mental Illness. - In two of the cases in the cohort we have
studied, the courts ruled that there was not strong enough evidence of mental
illness to make out a successful Panetti claim. 2 5 In Wood, the defendant had
based his Panetti claim on a delusional disorder; however, the district court
found that the defendant suffered from an antisocial personality disorder and

278 See id. at 604 n.9. See also Michael L. Perlin, The Sanist Lives of Jurors in Death Penalty Cases:
The Puzzling Role of MitigatingMental DisabilityEvidence, 8 NOTRE DAME J.L., ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y
239, 249-54 (1994) (discussing Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992) and the question of the impact
on jurors of a defendant being involuntarily medicated at trial).
279 See Kristin Houle, Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Stays Execution of Larry Hatten, TEX.
COALITION ABOLISH DEATH PENALTY (Oct. 14, 2014), https://tcadp.org/2014/10/14/texas-courtcriminal-appeals-stays-execution-larry-hatten/ [https://perma.cc/AT25-L2CH].
280 Riggins, 504 U.S. 127 (1992).
281 ShisInday v. Quarterman, 511 F.3d 514, 524 (5th Cir. 2007).
282 Basso v. Thaler, 359 Fed. App'x. 504, 507-08 (5th
Cir. 2010).
283 Basso v. Quarterman, H-07-3047, 2009 WL 9083708, at *16 (S.D. Tex. 2009). In a prior state
proceeding, the court had found that defense counsel's lack of notice regarding the appellant's medication
"was due to the appellant's failure to inform her attorneys of her treatment." Basso v. State, No. 73,672,
2003 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 3, at *11 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 2003).
284

Id.

285 Even prior to Panetti, legal scholars had urged that

&

following the lead of Atkins v. Virginia
(prohibiting execution of persons with mental retardation as it was known then) evidence of mental
illness should be a similar bar to execution. See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Mental Disorder as an
Exemption from the Death Penalty: The ABA-IRR Task Force Recommendations, 54 CATH. U. L. REV.
1133, 1133-34 (2005); Ronald J. Tabak, Executing People with Mental Disabilities: How We Can
Mitigate an Aggravating Situation, 25 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 283, 283-84 (2006); John H. Blume
Sheri Lynn Johnson, Killing the Non-Willing: Atkins, the Volitionally Incapacitated, and the Death
Penalty, 55 S.C. L. REV. 93 (2003); Christopher Slobogin, What Atkins Could Mean for People with
Mental Illness, 33 N.M. L. REV. 293, 313 (2003); Robert Batey, CategoricalBars to Execution: Civilizing
the Death Penalty, 45 HOUS. L. REv.1493, 152-55 (2009). That position was endorsed by, inter alia, the
ABA's House of Delegates, as well as by the American Psychiatric Association, the American
Psychological Association, and the National Alliance for the Mentally Ill [now known as NAMI]. Id.
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thus did not qualify as incompetent for execution. 286 The district court
"credited the expert's opinion who testified in accordance with the district
court's own experience, the court concluded that Wood does not suffer from
a delusional disorder, but rather has a highly manipulative antisocial
personality and thus is ineligible for relief under Panetti."287 Following an
evidentiary hearing, the district court ruled that the defendant failed to prove
that he had a mental illness and failed to show he was "incompetent for
execution under Panetti."288

Of special interest here was what led the district court judge to the
ultimate conclusion: "Without citing empirical data, the court found that
virtually all of the Texas death row inmates with whom this Court has dealt
have been diagnosed by qualified mental health professionals with antisocial
personality disorder." 28 9 The court goes on to say, "[i]t has been this Court's
experience that the vast majority of Texas prison inmates in general, and
Texas death row inmates in particular, demonstrate several significant
characteristics of antisocial personality disorder, specifically, an
unwillingness to accept responsibility for their criminal conduct." 290 As we
discussed above, this is a textbook example of the dangers of false "ordinary
common sense." 291 "I see it that way, therefore everyone sees it that way; I
see it that way, therefore that's the way it is." 292
In Simon, the Court again suggested that there was not strong evidence
of mental illness. 293 Dr. Goff, the defendant's expert, found that the
defendant's medical records quite "'strongly suggest the occurrence of a
significant neuropsychological event"' around the time the defendant was
admitted to the infirmary. 294 This event, a severe head injury, "may well
constitute a mental illness or defect that is preventing him from
comprehending the reasons for the penalty imposed upon him[.]" 295

286

Wood v. Stephens, 540 Fed. App'x. 422, 424 (5th Cir. 2013).

287

Id.

288 Wood v. Stephens, 619 Fed. App'x. 304, 305 (5th Cir. 2015). Also noted above, the defendant's

expert, Dr. Michael Roman, concluded Wood had a delusional disorder as defined by the DSM-IV-TS,
that made him incompetent to be executed. Id. at 306. In contrast, the state's expert, Dr. Mary Alice
Conroy, found, after the two-day evidentiary hearing, that "Wood does not suffer from a delusional
disorder or any other mental illness." Id.
289 Wood, 540 Fed. App'x. at
424.
290 Wood v. Thaler, 787 F. Supp. 2d 458, 496 (W.D. Tex. 2011).
291 See Perlin & Lynch, My Brain, supra note 21, at 93-94 (".. . judges treated biologically-based
evidence in criminal cases involving questions of mental disability law (via privileging and subordination)
so as to conform to the judges' pre-existing positions."). See infra notes 293-97.
292 Perlin, "And I See Through Your Brain", supra note 133, at 21 n.84.
293 Simon v. Fisher, 641 Fed. App'x. 386, 390 (5th
Cir. 2016).
24 Simon v. McCarty, No. 2:11-CV-111-SA, 2014 WL 7338860, at *3 n.4 (N.D. Miss. Dec.
22, 2014).
29s Id. at *36.
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However, based on the state's contrary affidavits, the Mississippi Supreme
Court denied Simon's appeal because Dr. Goff's report was "equivocal,"
finding "uncertainty" in Dr. Goff's opinion. 296 As noted above, the court also
ruled that the defendant "ha[d] no history of mental illness" and concluded
that the district court did not clearly err in finding the defendant competent
to be executed.297
As previously discussed briefly, the relationship between traumatic brain
injury and the death penalty is a profound one, 298 and it is often one that is
missed by evaluators and correctional staff.299 By way of example, and
importantly, these injuries are not always reported in medical records. 300 The
disregard of the finding of the defendant's expert in this case may have been
a critical step on the litigation's entire path. 301
(e) Summary of Case Results. - State experts were ruled more credible
in 100% (4/4) of the cases (see Eldridge, Basso, Green, and Wood) in which
this issue arose. 30 2 Defense experts made concessions in 44% (4/9) of the
cases. 303 In two of the cases, the expert purportedly conceded to possible
malingering (Simon and Eldridge).304 In one case, the expert acknowledged
not using the proper diagnostic test for mental illness (Wood). 305 In the other
concession case, the defendant admitted and the expert agreed that he had a
rational understanding of his impending execution (Green).306
The issue of synthetic competency arose in 22% (2/9) of the cases (see
Basso and Shislnday).307 This issue was also prevalent in 50% (2/4) of the

296 Simon v. Epps, 463 Fed. App'x. 339, 348 n.6 (5th Cir. 2012). Later, the Fifth Circuit ruled that the
defendant's mental illness/memory problem was feigned. Simon, 641 Fed. App'x. at 390 (relying on
testimony by the state's expert that the defendant "was malingering his memory loss." Id. at 388).
297 Id. at 390.

298 See generally Lynch, Perlin & Cucolo, supra note 8.
299 Id. at 216.
3m See, e.g., Robert E. Hanlon et al., Neuropsychological Featuresof IndigentMurderDefendants and
Death Row Inmates in Relation to Homicidal Aspects of Their Crimes, 25 ARCHIVES CLIN.
NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 1, 6 (2009) (87% of the sample of murder defendants and death row inmates reported
a history of closed head trauma; however, only 10% had a documented history of traumatic brain injury,
based on medical and radiological records).
301 Simon, 463 Fed. App'x. at 342.
302 See Eldridge v. Stephens, 599 Fed. App'x. 123 (5th Cir. 2015); Basso v. Stephens,
555 Fed. App'x.
335 (5th Cir. 2014); Green v. Thaler, 699 F.3d 404 (5th Cir. 2012); wood v. Stephens, 619 Fed. App'x.
304 (5th Cir. 2015).
303 Simon, 463 Fed. App'x. 339; Eldridge, 599 Fed. App'x. 123; Wood, 619 Fed. App'x. 304; Green, 699 F.3d
404.
304 Simon, 463 Fed. App'x. 123; Eldridge, 599 Fed. App'x. 123.
305 But see supra note 182 and accompanying text, suggesting that he was in error when he made this
concession.
306 But see supra notes 193-95 and accompanying text.
37 See Basso, 555 Fed. App'x. at 343; ShisInday v. Quarterman, 511 F.3d 514, 521 (5th Cir. 2007).
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district court cases (see Billiot and Staley). 308 Claims by the state arguing
malingering was present in 33% (3/9) of the cases (see Eldridge, Basso, and
Simon). 309 Finally, there was a perceived lack of strong evidence of mental
illness in 22% (2/9) cases (see Simon and Wood). 310
(f) What Was Not Considered-Neuroscienceand Adequacy of Counsel
Issues. - Of interest is the fact that the authors could not find a single case
in this cohort in which the defendant introduced neuroscience testimony, 311
nor did the authors find any "Panetti case" in which it was alleged that
counsel was inadequate under the doctrine of Strickland v. Washington. 12

308 See Billiot v. Epps, No. 1:86CV549TSL, 2010 WL 1490298, at *3 (S.D. Miss. 2010); Staley v.
Dretke, No. 4:99-CV-186-Y, 2003 WL 22290536 (N.D. Tex. 2003).
39 See Eldridge, 599 Fed. App'x. at 132-33; Basso, 555 Fed. App'x. at 341-42; Simon, 641 Fed.
App'x. at 388.
310 Simon, 641 Fed. App'x. at 390; ; Wood, 619 Fed. App'x. at 305.
311 Co-author MLP had incorrectly predicted, some eleven years ago, that there would be a turn
to

neuroscience in such cases. See Perlin, Good and Bad, supra note 78, at 688, stating "As more and more
attention is paid to the role of neuroimaging in the courts, it is inevitable that this testimony will be used
(or at least, sought to be used) at such hearings, both by defendants and by prosecutors. See generally
Perlin, In These Times, supra note 135.
312 In a district court decision in Battaglia that preceded the litigation on the Panetti issue that we
discuss in this Article, the defendant unsuccessfully argued a Strickland claim on the merits. See Battaglia
v. Stephens, No. 3-09-CV-1904-B, 2013 WL 5570216 (N.D. Tex. 2013). Subsequently, the Fifth Circuit
did find that the defendant's counsel had "abandoned" him in the context of a state competency
proceeding, and then appointed new counsel and stayed execution. Battaglia v. Stephens, 824 F.3d 470,
473-75 (5th Cir. 2016). There was no discussion of counsel adequacy in the context of the defendant's
Panetti claims. Later, after a further stay of execution, the state court ruled that the defendant was
competent to be executed. See Battaglia v. State, 537 S.W.3d 57 (Tex. Crim. Ct. App. 2017). Battaglia
was then executed. See supra note 147. The state court discussed both the holding and the procedural
history of Panetti's case extensively. See Battaglia, 537 S.W.2d at 65-68. The state court applied the
Panettiholding to Battaglia's case. See id. at 81. They then concluded that the defendant was competent
to be executed. Id. at 96. There was no Strickland issue discussed in this state court opinion. One case in
this cohort has been remanded to state court for further proceedings on questions involving, inter alia,
adequacy of counsel. Powers v. Epps, No. 2:07CV20HTW, 2009 WL 901896 (S.D. Miss. 2009). Other
cases have cited Panetti and Strickland on separate issues. See, e.g., e.g., Spicer v. Cain, No. 18-60791,
2021 WL 4465828 (5th Cir. 2021); Ramey v. Lumpkin, 7 F.4th 271 (5th Cir. 2021); Smith v. Davis, 927
F.3d 313 (5th Cir. 2019); Busby v. Davis, 925 F.3d 699 (5th Cir. 2019). But none on an application of
Strickland to any of the Panetti issues discussed in this Article. Two district court decisions have
considered aspects of Panetti beyond the scope of this Article in the context of a Strickland claim. See
Blue v. Thaler, No. H-05-2726, 2010 WL 8742423 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (suggesting Panetti's ripeness
language inapplicable in cases involving alleged Strickland claims); Freeney v. Stephens, No. 4:14-CV373, 2016 WL 320768, at *10 n.4 (S.D. Tex. 2016) (that aspect of Panetti that deprives the antecedent
state court decision of the deference to which it is usually due is inapplicable in cases involving a run-ofthe-mill Strickland claim). See also Jones v. Stephens, 541 Fed. App'x. 399, 413 (5th Cir. 2013)
(describing defendant (unsuccessfully) relied on Panetti for an ineffectiveness of counsel claim). See
PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 1 (describing the quality of defense
counsel in death penalty cases involving defendants with mental disability in general). See Perlin, Harmon
& Chatt, supra note 15, at 309 (providing representation in such cases in the Fifth Circuit in particular.
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This is all the more perplexing, given the results of the exhaustive study done
by Professor Deborah Denno, finding that (1) between 1992 and 2012, there
were 800 criminal cases in which neuroscience evidence was introduced,313
and that (2) in this universe, there was an "unusually high number of
successful ineffective assistance of counsel claims regarding the omission or
misuse of neuroscientific evidence."3 14 Significantly, two-thirds of this
universe (366 cases or 66.18%) began as capital cases in which the defendant
was eligible for the death penalty even if that sentence was later reduced. 15
It is ironic that, over a decade ago, one of the authors (MLP) focused on
the potential impact that then-recent developments in neuroimaging 3 16 might
have on Panetti cases,317 and concluded that his answer was a "qualified
'maybe,' dependent on multiple interlocked variables." 318 It appears that
these developments have had virtually no impact whatsoever.

"The story of how the Fifth Circuit has dealt with Strickland appeals in cases involving defendants with
mental disabilities facing the death penalty is bizarre and frightening." Id. at 308.).
3" Deborah W. Denno, The Myth of the Double-Edged Sword: An Empirical Study of Neuroscience
Evidence in Criminal Cases, 56 B.C. L. REV. 493 (2015).
314 Debora W. Denno, How Courts in Criminal Cases Respond to Childhood Trauma, 103 MARQ. L.
REv. 301, 352 (2019).
315 Denno, supra note 313, at 502.
316 See Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, "In the Wasteland of Your Mind": Criminology, Scientific
Discoveries and the Criminal Process, 4 VA. J. CRIM. L. 304 (2016) [hereinafter Pelin & Lynch, In the
Wasteland]; Perlin & Lynch, My Brain, supra note 21; Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, "Some
Mother's Child Has Gone Astray": NeuroscientificApproaches to a TherapeuticJurisprudenceModel of
Juvenile Sentencing, 59 FAM. CT. REv. 478 (2021) [hereinafter Perlin & Lynch, Some Mother's Child].
317 Perlin, Good and Bad, supra note 78, at 671.
318 These variables included the following:
"
"
"
"

"

Will defense counsel seek to introduce such testimony, and what, exactly, can we expect such
testimony will say?
In cases involving indigent defendants, will Ake v. Oklahoma, be interpreted expansively or
restrictively?
Will prosecutors seek to introduce such testimony to rebut defendants' Panetti applications?
To what extent are judges more or less impervious to the "dazzle" or "Christmas tree effect"
of such testimony than are jurors? See Michael L. Perlin, "His Brain Has Been Mismanaged
with GreatSkill": How Will JurorsRespond to Neuroimaging Testimony in Insanity Defense
Cases?, 42 AKRON L. REv. 885, 891-92 (2009).
How will such testimony be dealt with if there is a challenge under Daubert? Daubert v.
Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc, 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (in determining whether to admit
scientific evidence, the court must consider three factors: (1) the reliability, (2) the relevancy,
and (3) the possible prejudicial nature of the evidence). Most recent scholarship tells us that
the Daubert game is "fixed" against criminal defendants. See Susan Rozelle, Daubert,
Schmaubert: CriminalDefendants and the Short End of the Science Stick, 43 TULSA L. REV.
597, 598 (2007) ("the game of scientific evidence looks fixed."). According to a recent piece
studying Daubertoutcomes in criminal cases in Wisconsin, the state was successful in all 134
criminal appellate cases on Daubert issues. See Michael D. Cicchini, The DaubertDouble
(forthcoming),
accessible
at
MICH.
ST.
L.
REV.
__
Standard, 2021
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3787772.
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ALTERNATIVE JURISPRUDENTIAL FILTERS 319

A.

On Therapeutic Jurisprudence320

Therapeutic jurisprudence [hereinafter "TJ"] focuses on the law's
influence on emotional life and psychological well-being, 321 and "asks us to
look at law as it actually impacts people's lives." 322 It requires that we look
at the "real world" implications of the way the legal system regulates
individuals' behavior, most importantly, the way it regulates the lives and
behavior of those who are marginalized. 323
TJ's aim is to determine whether legal rules, procedures, and lawyer roles
can or should be reshaped to enhance their therapeutic potential while not
subordinatingdue process principles.324 There is an inherent tension in this

How will fact-finders deal with such testimony in cases where the evidence revealed by
neuroimaging testimony does not comport with their (false) "ordinary common sense" view
of "crazy" criminal defendants?
See Michael L. Perlin, "I've Got My Mind Made Up:" How Judicial Teleology in Cases Involving
Biologically Based Evidence Violates Therapeutic Jurisprudence,24 CARDOZO J. EQUAL RTS. & SOC.
JUST. 81, 98 (2018) [hereinafter Perlin, Mind Made Up].
319 In addition to therapeutic jurisprudence
discussed extensively infra notes 320-33 and
accompanying text there are other alternative jurisprudences (procedural justice; restorative justice) that
ought to be considered in assessments of whether aspects of the law are, in fact, fair. See Michael L. Perlin,
"I Hope the Final Judgment's Fair": Alternative Jurisprudences,Legal Decision-Making, and Justice, in
.

THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY OF LEGAL DECISION-MAKING (Monica Miller et al eds.

2022). Although there is significant literature about both of these alternative jurisprudences in the context
of the death penalty in general (see, e.g., Marilyn Peterson Armour & Mark S. Umbreit, The Ultimate
Penal Sanction and "Closure" for Survivors of Homicide Victims, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 381 (2007)
(discussing procedural justice); C. Crystal Enekwa, Capital Punishment and the Marshall Hypothesis:
Reforming a Broken System of Punishment, 80 TENN. L. REV. 411 (2013) (discussing restorative justice)),
there is none in the context of Panettiin particular, or competence to be executed in general.
320 This section is largely adapted from Perlin & Lynch, Some Mother's Child, supra note 316, at 482.
Further, it distills the work of co-author MLP over the past twenty-eight years, beginning with Michael L.
Perlin, What Is TherapeuticJurisprudence?, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 623 (1993) [hereinafter Perlin,
What Is]. See generally Michael L. Perlin, "Have You Seen Dignity?": The Story of the Development of
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 27 U.N.Z. L. REV. 1135 (2017); Michael L. Perlin, "Changing of the
Guards": David Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence,and the Transformation of Legal Scholarship, 63
INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 3 (2019).
321 See David B. Wexler, Practicing Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Psycholegal Soft Spots and
Strategies, in DENNIS P. STOLLE ET AL., PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: LAW AS A HELPING
PROFESSION 45 (2000).
322 Bruce J. Winick, Foreword: Therapeutic JurisprudencePerspectives on Dealing with Victims of
Crime, 33 NOVA L. REV. 535, 535 (2009).
323 See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin & Heather Ellis Cucolo, "Tolling for the Aching Ones Whose Wounds
Cannot Be Nursed": The Marginalization of Racial Minorities and Women in Institutional Mental
Disability Law, 20 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 431 (2017).
3
See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, "And My Best Friend, My Doctor/Won't Even Say What It Is I've Got":
The Role and Significance of Counsel in Right to Refuse Treatment Cases, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 735,
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inquiry, but David Wexler clearly identifies how it must be resolved: The
law's use of "mental health information to improve therapeutic functioning
[cannot] impinge upon justice concerns."32 5 To be clear, "[a]n inquiry into
therapeutic outcomes does not mean that therapeutic concerns 'trump' civil
rights and civil liberties." 326
TJ, rather, seeks to use the law to empower individuals, enhance rights,
and promote well-being.327 It is "a sea-change in ethical thinking about the
role of law . . . a movement towards a more distinctly relational approach to
the practice of law . . . which emphasises psychological wellness over
adversarial triumphalism." 328 It supports an ethic of care, 329 and is inherently
"collaborative and interdisciplinary." 330
One of the keystones of TJ is a commitment to dignity.331 As Professor
Carol Zeiner has noted, "[t]herapeutic jurisprudence highlights the worth and
dignity of the individual human being."33 2 Dignity means that people
"possess an intrinsic worth that should be recognized and respected, and that

751 (2005); Heather Ellis Cucolo & Michael L. Perlin, "Farfrom the Turbulent Space": Considering the
Adequacy of Counsel in the Representation of Individuals Accused of Being Sexually Violent Predators,
18 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 125, 165 (2015).
325 See David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Changing Concepts of Legal Scholarship,
11 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 17, 21 (1993); see also David Wexler, Applying the Law Therapeutically, 5 APPLIED
& PREVENTIVE PSYCH. 179 (1996).

&

326 Michael L. Perlin, A Law of Healing, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 407, 412 (2000) [hereinafter Perlin, Law
of Healing]; Michael L. Perlin, "Where the Winds Hit Heavy on the Borderline": Mental Disability Law,
Theory and Practice, "Us" and "Them", 31 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 775, 782 (1998).
327 See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, "All His Sexless Patients": Persons with Mental
Disabilities and the Competence to Have Sex, 89 WASH. L. REV. 257, 278 (2014).
328 Warren Brookbanks, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Conceiving an Ethical Framework, 8 J.L.
MED. 328, 329-30 (2001); see also Bruce J. Winick, Overcoming Psychological Barriers to Settlement:
Challenges for the TJ Lawyer, in THE AFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL: PRACTICING LAW AS A
HEALING PROFESSION 341 (Marjorie A. Silver ed., 2007) [hereinafter Winick, Overcoming Psychological
Barriers]; Bruce J. Winick & David B. Wexler, The Use of Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Law School
Clinical Education: Transforming the Criminal Law Clinic, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 605, 605-06 (2006)
[hereinafter Winick & Wexler, Use of Therapeutic]. The use of the phrase dates to CAROL GILLIGAN, IN
A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982). On how to practice law from a TJ perspective, see articles and essays collected
in STOLE ET AL., supra note 321.
329 See, e.g., Winick & Wexler, Use of Therapeutic, supra note 328, at 605-07; David B. Wexler, Not
Such a Party Pooper: An Attempt to Accommodate (Many of) Professor Quinn's Concerns about
Therapeutic Jurisprudence Criminal Defense Lawyering, 48 B.C. L. REV. 597, 599 (2007); Gregory
Baker, Do You Hear the Knocking at the Door? A "Therapeutic" Approach to Enriching Clinical Legal
Education Comes Calling, 28 WHITTIER L. REV. 379, 385 (2006).
330 Therapeutic Jurisprudence - A Strong Community and Maturing Discipline, in THE
METHODOLOGY AND PRACTICE OF THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 15, 18 (Nigel Stobbs, Lorana Bartels

& Michel Vols, eds. 2019).
'

BRUCE J. WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT: A THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE MODEL 161 (2005); see

also Perlin, What Is, supra note 320, at 633.
332 Carol L. Zeiner, Should Therapeutic Jurisprudence Be Used to Analyze Impacts of Legal Processes
on Government?, 28 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 1, 6 (2016).
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they should not be subjected to treatment by the state that is inconsistent with
their intrinsic worth."
B.

333

Therapeutic Jurisprudenceand the Dispositive Factorsin Post-Panetti

Cases in the Fifth Circuit
1. Introduction. - A review of the cohort of cases we examine here
reveals that the principles of therapeutic jurisprudence are utterly ignored. In
the words, again, of Professor Stephen Morse, writing in this context, they
are "unfair and offensive to the dignity of criminal justice." 334 In Justice
Marshall's opinion in Ford v. Wainwright, he focused on how the Eighth
Amendment is the tool by which we "protect the dignity of society itself from
the barbarity of exacting mindless vengeance." 335 This protection was absent
from Panetti's initial trial, 336 and, again, from the cohort of post-Panetticases
discussed here. Again, this absence violates any concept of therapeutic
jurisprudence. 337
2. TJ and Expert Believability. - It is well known that in another area of
the law involving litigants with severe mental disabilities, studies show that
judges "rubber stamp" the conclusion of state clinical witnesses in between
79% and 100% of all cases, most frequently exceeding 95%.338 One of the
authors (MLP) has written about how TJ demands a re-evaluation of the role
of expert witnesses in death penalty cases who too often have testified on
behalf of the state, there is no other word, fraudulently.339
Just as importantly, courts are teleological in cases involving all litigants
with mental disabilities. Judges decide cases in outcome-determinative ways;

3 Michael L. Perlin & Heather Ellis Cucolo, "Something's Happening Here/But You Don't Know
What It Is": How Jurors (Mis)ConstrueAutism in the Criminal Trial Process, 82 U. PITT. L. REv. 585,
617-18 (2021) (quoting Carol Sanger, DecisionalDignity: Teenage Abortion, Bypass Hearings, and the
Misuse of Law, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 409, 415 (2009)).
'3
Morse, supra note 90, at 642.
.
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 409 (1986).
336 See generally Richard Bonnie, Panetti v. Quarterman: Mental Illness, the Death Penalty, and
Human Dignity, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 257 (2007).
See Perlin, Good and Bad, supra note 78, at 688 (concluding that the Supreme Court's opinion in
Panetti "frontally considers the implications of this dilemma.").
338 Bruce J. winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudenceand the Civil Commitment Hearing, 10 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 37, 41-42 (1999) (citing, inter alia, Norman G. Poythress, MentalHealth Expert Testimony:
CurrentProblems, 5 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 201, 213 (1977); Jan C. Costello, Why Would INeed A Lawyer?
Legal Counsel and Advocacy for People with Mental Disabilities, in LAW, MENTAL HEALTH AND
MENTAL DISORDER 15, 17 (Bruce D. Sales & Daniel W. Shuman eds., 1996)).
3 See Michael L. Perlin, "Your Corrupt Ways Had Finally Made You Blind": Prosecutorial
Misconduct and the Use of "EthnicAdjustments" in Death Penalty Cases of Defendants with Intellectual
Disabilities,65 AM. U.L. REv. 1437 (2016) (discussing the spurious use of "ethnic adjustments" in cases
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social science that enables judges to satisfy predetermined positions is
privileged, while data that would require judges to question such ends are
rejected. 340 Empirical research tells us that judges treat biologically-based
evidence in criminal cases involving questions of mental disability law (via
privileging and subordination) so as to conform to the judges' pre-existing
positions.34I In short, they privilege such evidence (where that privileging
serves what they perceive as a socially-beneficial value) and subordinate
(where that subordination serves what they perceive as a similar value)
evidence of mental illness.342
In the relevant cases in the cohort studied, there is not an iota of evidence
that suggests any valid and reliable reason for the court to have privileged the
testimony of the state witnesses and subordinated the testimony of the
defense witnesses, other than because that gambit allowed them to decide the
case in the way they wished.343 This is truly a fatal misuse of what we have
characterized as "false ordinary common sense." 344
3. TJ and Expert Funding. - Although the Supreme Court has twice
decided cases granting indigent defendants access to expert assistance, 345
lower court interpretations have, by and large, been "penurious." 346
Ironically, in a recent article about the increase in criminal cases involving

involving defendants with intellectual disabilities). "The worthless and baseless testimony of Dr. James
Grigson on questions of future dangerousness, and how that testimony led inexorably to the improper
executions of defendants with mental disabilities, is well known." Perlin, Merchants and Thieves, supra
note 31, at 1528 (citing PERLIN, MENTAL DISASBILITY AND THE DEALTH PENALTY, supra note 1, at 1928). Dr. Grigson was decertified by both the American Psychiatric Association and the Texas Society of
Psychiatric Physicians in 1995, but he was called by the state as an expert witness in at least fifty-seven
such cases from 1995 until his death in 2004. Id. at 1528.
340 Perlin, Mind Made Up, supra note 318, at 82; see also David L. Faigman, "Normative
ConstitutionalFact-Finding":Exploring the EmpiricalComponent of ConstitutionalInterpretation, 139
U. PA. L. REv. 541, 549 (1991) ("Some commentators suggest that the Court's use of science is
disingenuous; these critics believe that the Court cites empirical research when it fits the Court's particular
needs, but eschews it when it does not.").
34' Perlin & Lynch, In the Wasteland, supra note 316, at 333-34 (discussing the research reported in
Nicholas Scurich & Adam Shniderman, The Selective Allure ofNeuroscientificExplanations, 9 PLOS ONE
(Sep.
10,
2014),
http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0107529
[https://perma.cc/97DW-XF85]).
342 Michael L. Perlin, "Baby, Look Inside Your Mirror": The Legal Profession's Willful and Sanist
Blindness to Lawyers with Mental Disabilities,69 U. PITT. L. REv. 589, 599-600 (2008); see also JOHN

Q. LA FOND &

MARY L. DURHAM, BACK TO THE ASYLUM: THE FUTURE OF MENTAL HEALTH LAW AND

POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 156 (1992).

343

See Perlin & Lynch, My Brain, supra note 21, at 93-94.
See, e.g., id. at 97-99.
See supra notes 130-33 (discussing Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985) and McWilliams v.
Dunn, 137 S. Ct. 1790 (2017)).
346 Perlin, Merchants and Thieves, supra note 31, at 1506 n.19 (noting that this has caused some of
those cases to become "an utter sham.").

344
345
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neuroscience evidence, one of the authors (MLP) and another colleague
concluded that this expansive use of such testimony "will be a good thing
only if . .. the Supreme Court's holding in Ake is expanded so that lawyers
representing indigent defendants . . . receive court approval for expert
funding." 3 47

The cases in the cohort we have studied here basically ignore the
teachings of Ake and McWilliams, as well as, in the case of Powers, the
American Bar Association. Once more, they mock the principles of
therapeutic jurisprudence.
4. TJ and Malingering. - In an earlier article about other Fifth Circuit
cases, the authors concluded that "the tiresome and threadbare allegations of
malingering ... basely, and disgracefully, violate the most minimal standards
of therapeutic jurisprudence." 348 Elsewhere, one of the authors (MLP) has
concluded that courts' teleological decisions in the area of malingering lawemploying outcome-determinative reasoning, in which social science that
enables judges to satisfy predetermined positions is privileged, while data
that would require judges to question such ends are rejected-violate TJ. 349
In each of the relevant cases discussed in this Article, the trial judges
accepted at face value the states' experts who testified that the defendants
malingered. 35 0 In none of the opinions is there any consideration of the
extensive valid and reliable evidence that tells us that even "clinicians
working in forensic settings, who are familiar with malingering, have a high

347 Perlin & Lynch, My Brain, supra note 21, at 96-97. Compare Giannelli, supra note 130, with
Lucas, supra note 132 (criticizing limiting interpretations of Ake).
348 Perlin, Harmon & Wetzel, supra note 15, at 496. See also Bruce J. Winick, Redefining the Role of
the Criminal Defense
Lawyer at Plea Bargaining
and Sentencing: A
Therapeutic
Jurisprudence/PreventiveLaw Model, 5 PSYCH., PUB POLY, & L. 1034 (1999) (concluding that a
professional who is not part of the offender's treatment team might be called to counter any claim of
malingering). See Perlin, Deceived Me, supra note 131 (discussing the need for multiple experts in such
cases).
34 Perlin, Mind Made Up, supra note 318, at 81.
35 It appears that three of the five defendants in the cohort of cases in which malingering was raised
were African American. See MississippiDepartment of CorrectionsOffender Data Sheet, MISS. DEP'T
CORR.,
https://www.mdoc.ms.gov/Death-Row/DeathRowlnmates/Simon,%20Robert%20Jr.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HMG2-WBJ9];
George
Cornelius
Eldridge,
TEX.
DEP'T
CORR.,
https://www.tdcj.texas.gov/deathrow/dr_info/eldridgegerald.jpg [https://perma.cc/963X-FKMG; Texas
Man Executed for Killing 12-Year-Old Girl, USA TODAY (Oct. 11, 2012, 12:30 AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2012/10/1 1/texas-execution/1626179/
[https://perma.cc/S2XB-6AA7]. There is substantial evidence that clinicians may overdiagnose
malingering in black defendants. See Dewey G. Cornell & Gary L. Hawk, Clinical Presentation of
MalingerersDiagnosedby Experienced ForensicPsychologists, 13 L. & HUM. BEHAv. 375, 382 (1989)
(discussed in this context in Alison J. Lynch & Michael L. Perlin, "I See What Is Right and Approve, But
I Do What Is Wrong": Psychopathy and Punishment in the Context of Racial Bias in the Age of
Neuroimaging,25 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 453, 473 n.118 (2021)).
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misidentification rate."351 By way of examples, one well-known study reports
that only 8% of defendants studied actually malingered,35 2 whereas another
study tells us that only 1.5% met the criteria for malingering. 353
Interestingly, the Supreme Court has taken a more nuanced view. In
McWilliams, in ruling that the defendant had the right to an expert witness to
"help ... the defense evaluate the [assigned doctor's] report [and defendant's]
medical records and translate these data into a legal strategy,"35 4 it noted that
his "purported malingering was not necessarily inconsistent with mental
illness."35 5 There is no evidence that any of the cohort of cases that were
decided after McWilliams under study here ever considered this language.
The aim of TJ-to maximize "psychological wellness" 3 56-is
utterly
ignored.
5. TJ and Synthetic Competency. - Following the decision in State v.
Perry,357 Professors David Wexler and Bruce Winick raised the issue of the
"therapeutic implications of permitting the state to coercively treat a
defendant found incompetent to be executed." 358 This has been an
astonishingly-under-considered topic. 35 9 In an important article written
nearly thirty years ago, Winick set out a strong case as to why medicating
prisoners to make them competent to be executed violated TJ tenets. 360
Winick looked at a variety of factors including the consequences to the
"healing professions" that would have to administer this medication; the way

s JOHN PARRY & ERIC Y. DROGIN, MENTAL DISABILITY: LAW, EVIDENCE, AND TESTIMONY 243

(2007).
352 Dustin B. Wygant et al., Association of the MMPI-2 Restructured Form (MMPI-2-RF) Validity
Scales with Structured Malingering Criteria, 4 PSYCH. INJ. & L. 13, 18 (2011).
35 Tayla T. C. Lee et al., Examining the Potential for Gender Bias in the Prediction of Symptom
Validity Test Failure by MMPI-2 Symptom Validity Scale Scores, 24 PSYCH. ASSESSMENT 618, 621
(2012). Both the Wygant study (see Wygant, supra note 352) and the Lee study are discussed in this
context

in

GERALD

YOUNG,

MALINGERING,

FEIGNING,

AND

RESPONSE

BIAS

IN

PSYCHIATRIC/PSYCHOLOGICAL INJURY: IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE AND COURT 44-45 (2014), and in

&

Gerald Young & Eric Drogin, Psychological Injury and Law I: Causality, Malingering, and PTSD, 3
MENTAL HEALTH L. & POL'Y J. 373, 408 (2013).
3 McWilliams v. Dunn, 137 S. Ct. 1790, 1800 (2017).
3 Id.
356 See Brookbanks, supra note 328, at 329-30.
3 State v. Perry, 502 So. 2d 543, 546 (La. 1986). See supra section IIA.
358 David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence as a New Approach to Mental
Health Law Policy Analysis and Research, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 979, 993 (1991) [hereinafter Wexler
Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence]. See also David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic
Jurisprudence and Criminal Justice Mental Health Issues, 16 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP.
225, 226 (1992).
3 See Bruce J. Winick, Competency to Be Executed: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspective, 10
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 317 (1999) [hereinafter Winick, Competency]. See infra notes 360-63 and
accompanying text. There has been virtually no literature on this topic since.
31 Winick, Overcoming Psychological Barriers, supra note 328.
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that it would dehumanize the prisoner; the likelihood that the prisoner would
seek to resist and frustrate such treatment; 36 1 and further urged that the thenrecent case of Perry v. Louisiana362 suggested a new "research agenda for
social scientists." 363 But there has been virtually no literature about this
important topic-from any perspective-since the Panetti case.364
And the decisions considered here do not take these issues seriously in
the least, thus, once more, ignoring the principles of therapeutic
jurisprudence. Certainly, the admonitions of Professors Wexler and Winick
saying "the constitutionality of coercive treatment of death row inmates
found incompetent to be executed," 365 in which they offered lists of TJfocused questions designed to help answer and foster sound legal rules and
rulings, 366 have not been the subject of thoughtful consideration by the courts.
6. TJ and the Future. - It is clear to us that the Fifth Circuit has not,
even remotely, factored in the teachings of therapeutic jurisprudence in its
post-Panetti decisions. These cases reflect a remarkable lack of
individualization in the court's decision-making process:
* the state's witness says the defendant was malingering, and,
ergo, the defendant malingered; 367

361 Id. at 333. This aspect of Winick's article is considered carefully in Jamie Mickelson,
"Unspeakable Justice": The Oswaldo Martinez Case and the Failure of the Legal System to Adequately
Providefor Incompetent Defendants, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2075, 2096-97 (2007).
362 Perry v. Louisianna, 494 U.S. 1015 (1990). See also supra notes 98-114.
363 Winick, Overcoming Psychological Barriers, supra note 328, at 337. Over two decades ago, coauthor MLP relied on Winick's article in arguing that the underlying question "screams out for analysis."
Perlin, Law of Healing, supra note 326, at 432.
" For other pre-Panetti (non-TJ-focused) literature, see, e.g., Kirk Heilbrun & Harry A. McClaren,
Assessment of Competency for Execution? A Guide for Mental Health Professionals,16 BULL. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 205 (1988); Mark A. Small & Randy Otto, Evaluationsof Competency to be Executed:
Legal Contours and Implications for Assessment, 18 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 146 (1991); Patricia A. Zapf,
Marcus T. Boccaccini & Stanley L. Brodsky, Assessment of Competency for Execution: Professional
Guidelines and an Evaluation Checklist, 21 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 103 (2003); Mark Cunningham, Special
Issues in Capital Sentencing, 2 APPL. PSYCH. CRIM. JUST. 205 (2006); Kirk Heilbrun, The Assessment of
Competency for Execution: An Overview, 5 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 383 (1987); Mark Cunningham,
Competence to be Executed [Case Report], in FORENSIC MENTAL HEALTH ASSESSMENT: A CASEBOOK

96 (Kirk Heilbrun, Geoffrey Marczyk & David DeMatteo eds. 2002).
365 Wexler & Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence,supra note 358, at 990.
366 Although Professor David Yamada recently cited this discussion to reflect an important part of TJ's
"initial foundational base," Therapeutic Jurisprudence:Foundations, Expansion, and Assessment, 75 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 660, 671 (2021), other than Professor Winick's 1999 article, see Winick, Competency,
supra note 359, there has been virtually no literature on this topic since.
367 E.g., Basso v. Stephens, 555 Fed. App'x. 335 (5th Cir. 2014); Simon v. Fisher, 641 Fed. App'x.
386 (5th Cir. 2016); Eldridge v. Davis, 661 Fed. App'x. 253 (5th Cir. 2016).
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the state seeks to involuntarily medicate the prisoner to make
him competent to be executed, and such medication is
ordered; 368
* the state witness comes to a conclusion about the defendant, and
that conclusion is endorsed; 369 and
* the state opposes funding for experts-funding that clearly
would come within the ambit of both Ake and McWilliams-and
that funding is denied.370
In the aggregate, these decisions reflect an abject level of stereotypingon
the part of the court, and this stereotyping starkly reflects how this bias,
coupled with judges' use of false "ordinary common sense," 37 1 has a
significant impact on their decision-making processes. 372 On the other hand,
if the court embraced TJ principles, each of these decision-making "pressure
points" could have been invigorated with new options and individualized
decision-making.
First, as stated flatly by Judge Juan Ramirez and Professor Amy Ronner,
"the right to counsel is . . . the core of therapeutic jurisprudence." 373 As the
authors discussed extensively in a previous article on the Fifth Circuit's
wanton disregard of effectiveness-of-counsel issues in the context of the
Strickland case, "any death penalty system that provides inadequate counsel
and that, at least as a partial result of that inadequacy, fails to insure that
mental disability evidence is adequately considered and contextualized by
death penalty decision-makers, fails miserably from a therapeutic
jurisprudence perspective." 374 David Wexler and Bruce Winick foresaw this
nearly thirty years ago (applying TJ to cases involving incompetent death row
inmates), 375 yet, the Fifth Circuit has, basically, paid no attention to this.

E.g., Basso, 555 Fed. Appx. 335; ShisInday v. Quarterman, 511 F.3d 514 (5th Cir. 2007).
E.g., Wood v. Stephens, 619 Fed. App'x. 304 (5th Cir. 2015); Simon, 641 Fed. App'x. 386.
370 E.g., Powers v. Epps, No. 2:07CV20HTW, 2009 WL 901896 (S.D. Miss. 2009); Battaglia v.
Stephens, 824 F.3d 478 (5th Cir. 2016); Charles v. Stephens, 612 Fed. App'x. 214 (5th Cir. 2015).
37' E.g., Powers, 2009 WL 901896; Battaglia, 824 F.3d 478; Charles, 612 Fed. Appx. 214.
372 See, e.g., Colleen M. Berryessa, Judicial Stereotyping Associated with Genetic Essentialist Biases
Toward Mental Disorders and Potential Negative Effects on Sentencing, 53 L. & SoC' Y REv. 202 (2019);
Colleen M. Berryessa, Judges' Views on Evidence of Genetic Contributions to Mental Disorders in Court,
27 J. FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY & PSYCH. 586 (2016).
3?3 Juan Ramirez Jr. & Amy D. Ronner,
Voiceless Billy Budd: Melville's Tribute to the Sixth
Amendment, 41 CAL. W. L. REV. 103, 119 (2004).
374 Perlin, Harmon & Chatt, supra note 15, at 306 (quoting Michael L. Perlin, "The Executioner's
Face is Well Hidden": The Role of Counsel and the Courts in Determining Who Dies, 41 N.Y. L. SCH. L.
368

369

REv. 201, 235 (2020)).

311

See Wexler & Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, supra note 358.
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Second, the inability of some of the defendants in the cohort under
consideration 376 to retain mitigation experts (and the Court's blithe ignoring
of the ABA Standards related to mitigation) 377 again violate TJ principles.
Rebecca Covarrubias's admonition to defense counsel in death penalty
cases-to "gather as much information as possible about the defendant's
history including police reports, medical records, birth records, pediatric
records and hospital records" 37 8-sets
out a TJ blueprint for the
representation of defendants, one that needs to be adopted by the Fifth Circuit
and other courts hearing similar death penalty cases. 379
Third, the use of state-sanctioned psychiatry (medicating incompetent
defendants) violates their dignity and also "delegitimizes the process
involved, making that process anti-therapeutic not solely for those
incompetent persons facing death, but for all subject to the same penalty." 380
Similarly, prosecutors who call expert witnesses knowing that the "scientific
bases" of the experts' testimony is baseless (perhaps, at this point in time,
fraudulent) similarly invalidate the legitimacy of the proceedings in
question.38I
Fourth, courts should be obligated to take into account TJ principles and
TJ teachings in deciding cases involving seriously mentally ill defendants,
whether they are facing the death penalty or not. In a full-length book about
the insanity defense written by co-author MLP over twenty-five years ago,
this was the recommendation:
[W]e must rigorously apply therapeutic jurisprudence principles to
each aspect of the insanity defense. We need to take what we learn
from therapeutic jurisprudence to strip away sanist behavior,
pretextual reasoning and teleological decision making from the
insanity defense process. This would enable us to confront the
pretextual use of social science data in an open and meaningful way. 382

376

See, e.g., Battaglia, 824 F.3d 478.

3?? See AM. BAR Assoc., supra note 208.
378 Rebecca Covarrubias, Lives in Defense Counsel's Hands: The Problems and Responsibilities of
Defense Counsel Representing Mentally Ill or Mentally Retarded CapitalDefendants, 11 SCHOLAR 413,

467 (2009).

379

Id.

380 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE DEATH Penalty, supra note 1, at 1541-42.
381

Id.

382 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE 443 (1994), as discussed in

this context in Michael L. Perlin, "Too Stubborn to Ever Be Governed by Enforced Insanity": Some
Therapeutic JurisprudenceDilemmas in the Representation of CriminalDefendants in Incompetency and
Insanity Cases, 33 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 475, 483 (2010).
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The exact same prescription applies to cases involving defendants with
mental disabilities facing the death penalty. 383 Had the Fifth Circuit
acknowledged the precepts of therapeutic jurisprudence, had it recognized
TJ's focus on dignity,3 84 had it even considered the role of compassion in the
judicial process, 385 it could never have decided this entire array of cases in
the way it did.
CONCLUSION

When the authors embarked on the Strickland project, they expected that
that case would have been interpreted grudgingly by the Fifth Circuit, but
their findings far surpassed their fears. 386 There, as noted above, the authors
concluded that that cohort of cases was "an embarrassment to our system of
criminal law and procedure." 387 When they embarked on the Atkins
project, 388 they had no greater hopes, and again, the results were "infinitely
depressing." 38 9 The authors undertook this current project in the vainlyoptimistic hopes that the Circuit's track record would be somewhat better.
However, it is not. In fact (and the authors never would have believed
this when starting their research), it is far worse. One of the reasons, the
authors believe, that the Supreme Court granting certiorari in Panetti was in
response to the reality, cited above, that the Fifth Circuit had not found a
single death row defendant (of an n of at least 360) to be incompetent to be
executed in the two decades since the court had decided Ford v.
Wainwright.390 And that streak continues. There may be some irony that the
only two "victories" for defendants within the Fifth Circuit on Panetti issues
took place at the district court level, and that in neither case did the state

383

Id.

384 It is not insignificant that in Ford, Justice Marshall highlighted the importance of dignity, noting
that the court was bound to consider "whether a particular punishment comports with the fundamental
human dignity that the [Eighth] Amendment protects." Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406 (1986).
385 "Justice with compassion is one of the central premises of TJ, and a judge who demonstrates
compassion best 'represent[s] the goals of therapeutic jurisprudence."' Perlin, In These Times, supra note
135, at 11 (citing, in part, LeRoy Kondo, Advocacy of the EstablishmentofMental Health Specialty Courts
in the Provisionof Therapeutic Justicefor Mentally Ill Offenders, 28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 255, 287-8 (2001)).
386 See Perlin, Harmon & Chatt, supra note 15, discussed in this context supra notes 23-25 and
accompanying text.
387 Id. at 309.
388 See Perlin, Harmon & Wetzel, supra note 15, discussed in this context supra notes 15-20 and
accompanying text.
389 Id. at 497.

39 Perlin, Merchants and Thieves, supra note 31, at 1534-45 (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
Panetti, No. 06-6407, 2006 WL 3880284, at *26.). See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
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appeal. 391 In an article written just after the Panetti decision, Professor
Richard Bonnie discussed how that case "amply documented" the "appalling
failures" of the criminal justice system. 392 The near-quarter century since that
decision has amplified these failures even more.
In the authors' article on Strickland, they concluded that "the Fifth
Circuit regularly and consistently mocked the idea of adequate and effective
counsel." 393 In our piece on Atkins, we concluded that "an alternative title for
this article could have been Mental Disability and the Death Penalty: The
Shame of the Fifth Circuit." 394 The lyric from the Bob Dylan song,
Highlands, from which the authors drew the beginning of this Article's title
is "Insanity is smashing up against my soul." The authors can say, without
any fear of contradiction, that the Fifth Circuit, simply, has no soul.

"

See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.

392 Bonnie, supra note 336, at 282. "The prisoner has a right, even under imminent sentence of death,

to be treated as a person, worthy of respect, not as an object of the State's effort to carry out its promises."
Id. at 277.
"3 Perlin, Harmon & Chatt, supra note 15, at 308.
34 Perlin, Harmon & Wetzel, supra note 15, at 498.
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APPENDIX

Table 1: Citations to Panettiv. Quartermanon issues related to competency
to be executed (including cases directly involving Scott Panetti) (46 total)
Basso v. Stephens, 555 Fed. App'x. 335 (5th Cir. 2014)
Battaglia v. Davis, 2018 WL 550518 (5th Cir. 2018)
Battaglia v. Stephens, 824 F.3d 478 (5th Cir. 2016)
Charles v. Stephens, 612 Fed. App'x. 214 (5th Cir. 2015)
Eldridge v. Davis, 661 Fed. App'x. 253 (5th Cir. 2016)
Eldridge v. Stephens, 599 Fed. App'x. 123 (5th Cir. 2015)
Eldridge v. Stephens, 608 Fed. App'x. 289 (5th Cir. 2015)
Green v. Thaler, 699 F.3d 404 (5th Cir. 2012)
Green v. Quarterman, 312 Fed. App'x. 635 (5th Cir. 2009)
Johnson v. Stephens, 617 Fed. App'x. 293 (5th Cir. 2015)
Martinez v. Quarterman, 2009 WL 211489 (5th Cir. 2009)
Panetti v. Davis, 863 F.3d 366 (5th Cir. 2017)
Panetti v. Stephens, 727 F.3d 398 (5th Cir. 2013)
Panetti v. Quarterman, 235 Fed. App'x. 328 (5th Cir. 2007)
ShisInday v. Quarterman, 511 F.3d 514 (5th Cir. 2007)
Simon v. Epps, 463 Fed. App'x. 339 (5th Cir. 2012)
Simon v. Fisher, 641 Fed. App'x. 386 (5th Cir. 2016)
Staley v. Dretke, 126 Fed. App'x. 667 (5th Cir. 2005)
Wood v. Stephens, 540 Fed. App'x. 422 (5th Cir. 2013)
Wood v. Stephens, 619 Fed. App'x. 304 (5th Cir. 2015)
Hoffman v. Cain, 2012 WL 1088832 (E.D. La. 2012)
Billiot v. Epps, 671 F. Supp. 2d 840 (S.D. Miss. 2009)
Billiot v. Epps, 2010 WL 1490298 (S.D. Miss. 2010)
Powers v. Epps, 2009 WL 901896 (S.D. Miss. 2009)
Simon v. Epps, 2011 WL 1988388 (N.D. Miss. 2011)
Simon v. McCarty, 2014 WL 7338860 (N.D. Miss. 2014)
Aldridge v. Thaler, 2010 WL 1050335 (S.D. Tex. 2010)
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Basso v. Stephens, 2014 WL 412549 (S.D. Tex. 2014)
Battaglia v. Stephens, 2013 WL 5570216 (N.D. Tex. 2013)
Charles v. Stephens, 2015 WL 11117729 (S.D. Tex. 2015)
Eldridge v. Thaler, 2009 WL 3858872 (S.D. Tex. 2009)
Eldridge v. Thaler, 2010 WL 555127 (S.D. Tex. 2010)
Eldridge v. Thaler, 2013 WL 416210 (S.D. Tex. 2013)
Green v. Thaler, 2012 WL 4765809 (S.D. Tex. 2012)
Hatten v. Quarterman, 2007 WL 2818009 (S.D. Tex. 2007)
Johnson v. Stephens, 2013 WL 4482865 (S.D. Tex. 2013)
Martinez v Quarterman, 2009 WL 10710035 (S.D. Tex. 2009)
Mays v. Director, 2020 WL 1333212 (E.D. Tex. 2020)
Panetti v. Dretke, 401 F. Supp. 2d 702 (W.D. Tex. 2004)
Panetti v. Thaler, 2010 WL 2640336, (W.D. Tex. 2010)
Panetti v. Thaler, 2012 WL 290115 (W.D. Tex. 2012)
Panetti v. Quarterman, 2008 WL 2338498 (W.D. Tex. 2008)
Saldano v. Director, 2016 WL 3883463 (E.D. Tex. 2016)
Wood v. Thaler, 787 F. Supp. 2d 458 (W.D. Tex. 2011)
Wood v. Quarterman, 572 F. Supp. 2d 814 (W.D. Tex. 2008)
Wood v. Quarterman, 2009 WL 10710464 (N.D. Tex. 2009)

Table 2: Excluded due to Atkins-related claims (20 total)
Blue v. Thaler, 665 F.3d 647 (5th Cir. 2011)
Brumfield v. Cain, 744 F.3d 918 (5th Cir. 2014)
Busby v. Davis, 925 F.3d. 699 (5th Cir. 2019)
Chester v. Thaler, 666 F.3d 340 (5th Cir. 2011)
Hall v. Quarterman, 534 F.3d 365 (5th Cir. 2008)
Hines v. Thaler, 456 Fed. App'x. 357 (5th Cir. 2011)
Ibarra v. Thaler, 691 F.3d 677 (5th Cir. 2012)
In Re Cathey, 857 F.3d 221 (5th Cir. 2017)
Ladd v. Stephens, 748 F.3d 637 (5th Cir. 2014)
Pierce v. Thaler, 604 F.3d 197 (5th Cir. 2010)
Rivera v. Quarterman, 505 F.3d 349 (5th Cir. 2007)
Wiley v. Epps, 625 F.3d 199 (5th Cir. 2010)
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Wilson v. Thaler, 450 Fed. App'x. 369 (5th Cir. 2011)
Brumfield v. Cain, 854 F. Supp. 2d 366 (M.D. La. 2012)
Wiley v. Epps, 668 F. Supp. 2d 848 (N.D. Miss. 2009)
Blue v. Thaler, 2013 WL 12112954 (S.D. Tex. 2013)
Braziel v. Stephens, 2015 WL 3454115 (N.D. Tex. 2015)
Bridgers v. Quarterman, 2008 WL 4500396 (E.D. Tex. 2008)
Cathey v. Davis, 2016 WL 9449738 (S.D. Tex. 2016)
Hearn v. Quarterman, 2008 WL 679030 (N.D. Tex. 2008)

Table 3: Excluded due to the issue of 2nd or successive petitions (29 total)
Adams v. Thaler, 679 F. 3d 312 (5th Cir. 2012)
Blackman v. Davis, 909 F. 3d 772 (5th Cir. 2018)
In Re Halprin, 788 Fed. App'x. 941 (5th Cir. 2019)
In Re Hensley, 836 F.3d 504 (5th Cir. 2016)
In Re Sepulvado, 707 F.3d 550 (5th Cir. 2013)
In Re Will, 970 F.3d 536 (5th Cir. 2020)
Leal Garcia v. Quarterman, 573 F.3d 214 (5th Cir. 2009)
Ramos v. Davis, 653 Fed. App'x. 359 (5th Cir. 2016)
Storey v. Lumpkin, 8 F.4th 382 (5th Cir. 2021)
United States v. Bernard, 820 Fed. App'x. 309 (5th Cir. 2020)
Collier v. Wyles, 2021 WL 1914244 (W.D. La. 2021)
Morgan v. Vannoy, 2021 WL 3009107 (W.D. La. 2021)
Runnels v. Edwards, 2019 WL 1714509 (W.D. La. 2019)
Turner v. Warden, 2012 WL 4960384 (W.D. La. 2012)
United States v. Boutte, 2012 WL 13103341 (W.D. La. 2012)
United States v. Givens, 2020 WL 6060949 (W.D. La. 2020)
Castaneda v. Davis, 2019 WL 691035 (W.D. Tex. 2019)
Fielding v. Davis, 2019 WL 1767338 (W.D. Tex. 2019)
Halprin v. Davis, 2019 WL 12095442 (N.D. Tex. 2019)
Halprin v. Davis, 2019 WL 12117150 (N.D. Tex. 2019)
Huff v. United States, 2015 WL 5252129 (S.D. Tex. 2015)
Ramos v. Stephens, 2014 WL 12675241 (S.D. Tex. 2014)
Ramos v. Stephens, 2014 WL 12675242 (S.D. Tex. 2014)
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Ramos v. Quarterman, 2008 WL 11325032 (S.D. Tex. 2008)
Reese v. United States, 2016 WL 9083384 (S.D. Tex. 2016)
Rodriguez v. United States, 2012 WL 1038575 (W.D. Tex. 2012)
United States v. Bernard, 2020 WL 7075300 (W.D. Tex. 2020)
Williams v. United States, 2013 WL 12231888 (W.D. Tex. 2013)
Zuniga v. Holder, 2014 WL 11283056 (W.D. Tex. 2014)

Table 4: Excluded due to "Opportunity to be Heard" references to Panetti
(1 total)
Hudson v. Director TDCJ-CID, 2018 WL 11304103 (E.D. Tex. 2018)

Table 5: Excluded due to Procedural Default (1 total)
Vasquez v. Stephens, 2016 WL 1238197 (S.D. Tex. 2016)

Table 6: Excluded due to only quoting/citing Panetti to explain the Court's
reasonable or unreasonable application of federal law (4 total)
Escamilla v. Stephens, 602 Fed. App'x. 939 (5th Cir. 2015)
Garcia v. Lumpkin, 824 Fed. App'x. 252 (5th Cir. 2020)
Jones v. Stephens (157 F. Supp. 3d 623 (N.D. Tex. 2016)
Wardrip v. Davis, 2018 WL 1536279 (N.D. Tex. 2018)

Table 7: Excluded as they dealt with Panetti'sinterpretation of the ripeness
doctrine (4 total)
In re Halprin, 88 Fed. App'x. 941 (5th Cir. 2019)
In re Sepulvado, 707 F.3d 550 (5th Cir. 2013)
Ramos v. Quarterman, 2008 WL 11325032 (S.D. Tex. 2008)
United States v. Bernard, 820 Fed. App'x. 309 (5th Cir. 2020)

Table 8: Excluded due to AEDPA-related issues (43 total)
Hayes v. Thaler, 361 Fed. App'x. 563 (5th Cir. 2010)
Hernandez v. Thaler, 398 Fed. App'x. 81 (5th Cir. 2010)
In Re Will, 970 F.3d 536 (5th Cir. 2020)
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Jones v. Stephens, 541 Fed. App'x. 399 (5th Cir. 2013)
Lucio v. Lumpkin, 987 F.3d 451 (5th Cir. 2021)
Ramey v. Lumpkin, 7 F.4th 271 (5th Cir. 2021)
Smith v. Cain, 708 F.3d 628 (5th Cir. 2013)
Smith v. Davis, 927 F.3d 313 (5th Cir. 2019)
Spicer v. Cain, 2021 WL 4465828 (5th Cir. 2021)
Manning v. Louisiana, 2021 WL 608742 (W.D. La. 2021)
Wilson v. Cain, 2016 WL 1444466 (W.D. La. 2016)
Woodfox v. Cain, 2012 WL 1676691 (M.D. La. 2016)
Chamberlin v. Fisher, 2015 WL 1485901 (S.D. Miss. 2015)
Kelly v. Kelly, 2007 WL 4966992 (S.D. Miss. 2007)
Smith v. Errington, 2019 WL 8228983 (S.D. Miss. 2019)
Spicer v. Fisher, 2016 WL 11475133 (S.D. Miss. 2016)
Armstrong v. Lumpkin, 2020 WL 8188422 (S.D. Tex. 2020)
Avila v. Quarterman, 499 F. Supp. 2d 713 (W.D. Tex. 2007)
Baldwin v. Thaler, 2011 WL 744742 (S.D. Tex. 2011)
Barbee v. Stephens, 2015 WL 4094055 (N.D. Tex. 2015)
Bess v. Davis, 2020 WL 2066732 (N.D. Tex. 2020)
Brown v. Thaler, 2011 WL 798391 (S.D. Tex. 2011)
Cade v. Davis, 2020 WL 6576179 (N.D. Tex. 2020)
Camacho v. Thaler, 2011 WL 3703718 (W.D. Tex. 2011)
Doyle v. Thaler, 2012 WL 2376642 (N.D. Tex. 2012)
Drones v. Lumpkin, 2020 WL 6888573 (S.D. Tex. 2020)
Edwards v. Stephens, 2014 WL 3880437 (N.D. Tex. 2014)
Freeney v. Stephens, 2016 WL 320768 (S.D. Tex. 2016)
Garcia v. Thaler, 2011 WL 13371386 (N.D. Tex. 2011)
Gaytan v. Collier, 2021 WL 1170216 (S.D. Tex. 2021)
Guzman v. United States, 2012 WL 13170875 (S.D. Tex. 2012)
Halprin v. Davis, 2017 WL 4286042 (N.D. Tex. 2017)
Holberg v. Davis, 2021 WL 3603347 (N.D. Tex. 2021)
Johnson v. Director TDCJ-CID, 2020 WL 4782312 (E.D. Tex. 2020)
Knod v. Director TDCJ-CID, 2011 WL 6016470 (E.D. Tex. 2011)
Nash v. Director TDCJ-CID, 2019 WL 9809650 (E.D. Tex. 2019)
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Petrus v. Quarterman, 2008 WL 2783673 (S.D. Tex. 2008)
Pridgen v. Director TDCJ-CID, 2019 WL 1760079 (E.D. Tex. 2019)
Pridgen v. Director TDCJ-CID, 2019 WL 2464769 (E.D. Tex. 2019)
Rodriguez v. Davis, 2020 WL 685668 (W.D. Tex. 2020)
Ruiz v. Davis, 2017 WL 1962758 (W.D. Tex. 2017)
Tercero v. Thaler, 2013 WL 474769 (S.D. Tex. 2013)
Wardrip v. Davis, 2017 8677939 (N.D. Tex. 2017)
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